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ABSTRACT 
 
IS BIG BROTHER PLAYING FAIR? EXPLORING EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED 
NEPOTISM IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS ON TRUST IN STRANGERS. 
 
 
by 
 
 
NEEQUAYE David Amon 
 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
Trust has proven to be a vital social capital. It has been implicated in a myriad of 
socially beneficial initiatives. While trust vested in familiar others remain important, 
trust extended to strangers is crucial to the continued development of social capital. 
This is because such interaction, though risky at times, forms a springboard to 
untapped opportunities. Using a multi-round trust game and self-report assessments 
the present study explored explanations for observed cultural differences in trust in 
strangers. Data was drawn from university students in Ghana and Hong Kong. Factor 
analysis showed that self-report trust in strangers was associated with trust in people 
of another religion and people of another nationality among Hong Kong Chinese, but 
was associated with trust in family members and people whom one knows personally 
among Ghanaians. While Hong Kong Chinese students reported higher level of trust 
in strangers, Ghanaian students showed higher level of trust in standard behavioural 
measure. Perceived nepotism in public institutions explained the observed cultural 
difference in self-report trust in strangers. Self-report trust in strangers and perceived 
nepotism in public institutions did not relate to behavioural trust in both samples. 
However, culture specific results with the behavioural measure indicated that dealing 
with a generous or thrifty individual impacted trust significantly. In both samples, 
participants dealing with a generous individual showed higher behavioural trust 
compared to those dealing with a thrifty individual. These results suggest that the 
influence of context on trust is twofold: distal, contextual factors, such as perceived 
nepotism in public institutions are influential to the cultural differences in self-report 
trust, whereas proximal, situational factors, such as generosity of a stranger, have 
more impact on actual trust behaviours. Altogether, this research showed that the 
contexts under which people function have substantial impact on trust. Specifically, 
individual’s experiences with the government institutions in a sociocultural context 
affect their tendency to trust unfamiliar others, but one’s immediate interaction with 
another person is more influential to their enactment of trust in a particular situation. 
Future research on trust should pay more attention to the effects of contexts, 
depending on how trust is operationalized. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Context and trust 
Trust forms a very basic fiber of every society regardless of where the analysis 
is made. In theorizing the psychosocial stages of human development, Erikson (1950) 
postulated that we face eight major conflicts as we age. The first of these conflicts 
according to Erikson is trust versus mistrust. This conflict revolves around the 
crossroads of infants coming to rely on others to be responsive to their needs 
(Sigelman & Rider, 2012). The conflict goes either way according to Erikson and 
this depends on how infants are treated by caregivers. The child may come to trust, if 
caregivers optimally provide for the child and mistrust if their needs are not well 
catered to. Considering a culture or society metaphorically as a child, like in 
Erikson’s theory, the question; what drives a culture of trust or mistrust? may be 
posed. What factors can be implicated as influencing individuals in a culture to be 
trusting or not? What makes people rely on each other to be responsive to each 
other’s needs? If Erickson’s model is relied on here as a metaphor, who or what 
serves as the caregiver? 
 
1.1. Nepotism in public institutions as a cultural influence on trust 
The current work examines public institutions as the potential "caregiver" that 
may influence whether individuals come to rely on each other to be responsive to 
each other’s needs or not. Is it possible that public institutions create a context that 
has consequent effects on attitudes, and how people behave? Social science research 
(Rothstein, 2005; Freitag & Buhlmann, 2009; Freitag & Traunmuller, 2009) has 
shown that when public institutions are perceived to be fair, immune to corruption, 
and egalitarian (i.e. not nepotistic in their dealings) the more individuals, functioning 
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in their domains, are likely to develop trust. The notion here is that widespread 
attitudes that individuals direct at others are strongly related to attitudes toward 
public institutions. Freitag and Buhlmann (2009) note that interactions that call for 
trust do not necessarily have to be based on familiarity. Rather, societies where 
public institutions in carrying out their duties, create a fair and egalitarian 
environments incentivize individuals toward collaborative behaviour because they 
limit the leverage of unpredictable behaviour. Freitag and Traunmuller (2009) 
additionally maintain that experiences and predispositions are essential foundations 
of trust. This foundation of trust however is still dependent on contexts.  
 
Along the line of contextual influence on trust, the present work explores the 
effect of levels of perceived nepotism in public institutions on trust in strangers. The 
assumption is that if public institutions in a society are perceived to be fair and 
egalitarian (i.e. relatively un-nepotistic), the citizens would be more likely to trust 
unfamiliar others. This is so because egalitarian public institutions promote norms of 
trustworthiness and intolerance to exploitation. By creating and promoting contexts 
that punish exploitation and reward trustworthiness, public institutions attenuate the 
risks that may be associated with trusting unfamiliar others. Trusting unfamiliar 
others carry added risks in that there is no prior information for predicting these 
individuals’ behaviours. Contexts that are quick to punish exploitation and reward 
trustworthy behaviour therefore provide some assurance toward safeguarding one’s 
interests when trusting strangers. 
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1.2. The Importance of trust vested in strangers 
Familiarity often breeds trust, as individuals with whom we have had previous 
dealings are predictable. Developing trust in strangers, on the other hand, presents a 
hurdle to maneuver since there is no previous information to assess whether these 
individuals are trustworthy or not. That notwithstanding trust extended to people 
whom we meet for the first time may lead to rewarding and lasting relationships. 
Vesting trust in strangers forms the bedrock of social capital. A lack of such social 
capital, as Putnam (1993) puts it, may be responsible for the failure in 
well-intentioned social policies.  
 
Fukuyama (1995) also argues that trust is vital to societal functioning. In a 
general sense it facilitates initiative that involves people stepping out of their comfort 
zones and taking action toward resource pooling, business venturing and tolerance. It 
then becomes important to explore the nature of trust pertinent to unfamiliar others. 
Yamagishi, Kikuchi and Kosugi (1999) note that even though commitment with 
familiar others reduces the risk of being exploited by strangers, it inhibits individuals 
from trying out new opportunities that may lie outside established relationships. 
Established commitments are useful in situations where there is a scarcity of 
opportunities outside existing relationships. However, in an increasingly 
cosmopolitan world, breaking out and interacting with unfamiliar others is an 
essential prerequisite for greater prospects. 
 
A lot of empirical work has gone into trying to define and accurately measure a 
generalized form of trust, which intends to capture the totality of one’s willingness to 
trust. Some of these findings may be extended to the discussion on trust in unfamiliar 
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others. The trust question - Generally speaking do you think most people can be 
trusted or you think you need to be careful in dealing with people – has been used in 
global surveys, such as the General Social Survey (GSS) and the World Value 
Survey (WVS), to assess generalized trust.  Even though this approach has spun a 
lot of intriguing results, it is saddled with confounds that cannot be ignored.  
 
The first issue that needs to be addressed is the nature of most people. Does 
most people include or exclude people known personally? This is especially critical 
when trust is studied across cultures. Dehley, Newton and Welzel (2011) found, in a 
51-nation study, that the general trust question used in the WVS (2005-2007) had 
different associations across cultures. Respondents from some countries associated 
the general trust question with in-group trust (trust in family, neighbours and known 
others), while other countries associated it with out-group trust (trust in people of 
another religion, people met for the first time and people of another nationality). This 
finding suggests that people’s self-report generalized trust may be differentially 
related to the targets they have in mind when answering the question. Stolle (2002) 
also notes that generalized trust extends beyond the confines of face-to-face 
interaction to include unknown others. The solution to undertaking a fine analysis of 
trust would be to specify the target of trust.  
 
Conceptualizing trust to be target specific eliminates confounds and streamlines 
the application of trust research. A step further will be to go beyond self-report 
measures and cross validate such data with behavioural measures.  As Fehr, 
Fischbacher, Rosenbaldt, Schupp and Wagner (2003) posit, experimental studies are 
prone to self-selection and homogeneous samples. Surveys on the other-hand are 
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handicapped by measurement error and questionable behavioural relevance. 
Integrating behavioural and self-report measures will cater for the weaknesses of 
both methods and increase ecological validity.  
 
The importance of trust in unfamiliar others and its lucid measurement is best 
discussed when context variables are considered. Such a discussion provides a 
holistic analysis. This is because how individuals behave in a social context speaks to 
how such a context has conditioned them. Welch, Sikkink, and Loveland (2007) 
remark that the character of a society and its overall culture is best revealed in the 
passing exchanges among strangers. One such character of a society concerns how 
public institutions relate to the citizens there. The actions taken by the public 
institutions are expected to create an enabling or inhibiting environment of trust in 
unfamiliar others. These cultural contexts shape trust vested in strangers. When 
public institutions foster a fair and egalitarian culture trust in strangers will be 
encouraged whereas corrupt public institutions discourage trust in strangers. This is 
because cultural contexts that safeguard fairness and equality reduce the risk of 
exploitation.  
 
1.1.Research questions 
In a nutshell, the present study explores the following research questions in a 
bid to contribute to the ever-evolving debate of conceptualizing trust, its antecedents, 
and consequential effects on attitudes and behaviour. 
 
1. What are the behavioural and self-report features of trust in strangers? How are 
these features related to one another in different cultures? 
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2. Do public institutions create an environment that influence trust in strangers? How 
does perceived nepotism in public institutions make a difference in trust in strangers 
across cultures? 
 
1.2. Organization of thesis 
The present work’s attempt to discuss trust aimed at strangers will be 
structured into four main sections. Chapter 2 will examine current literature on trust. 
It will scope the background of trust and how culture may influence results from trust. 
The role of public institutions in creating a nurturing environment for trust will also 
be discussed. It will then delve into debates surrounding definitions and underlying 
theories of trust. Though trust is often considered an important element of everyday 
functioning, its complexity is often ignored. In light of this the present work will 
examine the different aspects of the phenomenon, namely, trust, trust propensity and 
trustworthiness.  
 
Another area often glossed over when discussing trust is the influence of trust 
referents and how different trust referents may elicit diverse trust response patterns. 
Known others for example may elicit relational trust while unknown others may 
elicit a rational form of trust. This issue will be addressed by discussing the 
multifaceted nature of trust when considering trust referents.  
 
The thesis will then go on to look at how situational determinants are 
influential in vesting trust. While disposition and context remain important in the 
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debate on trust, social psychology research has shown that the effects of situation 
cannot be overlooked (e.g., Bond, 2013). The author therefore discusses research that 
has examined how situation affects trust. 
 
Discussing the background of trust necessitates an examination of its 
measurement, because measurements of subjectively defined constructs are vital to 
ascertaining the validity of theories formed on such constructs. Since the definition 
of trust has not reached a complete consensus yet, it would benefit any examination 
to explore how the concept has been measured overtime in relation to its definition.  
 
Chapter 3 will set the tone for expected cultural differences and summarizes 
justifications for the hypotheses to be tested. The chapter discusses the impact of 
socioeconomic and political climates on trust. Here, the Ghanaian context is 
compared to Hong Kong. The methodology section, chapter 4, will lay out 
procedures employed to investigate how public institutions influence trust in 
strangers. Here operational definitions, research design, measures and general 
procedure employed to conduct the study will be discussed.  
 
Chapter 5 will present the analytical strategy and results. In this section 
results from self-report and experimental data would be presented. Chapter 6, the 
discussion section, will discuss presented results focusing on how findings fit with 
current literature. Furthermore methodological and practical implications will be 
presented. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Background of Study 
Trust has been researched quite extensively and despite the depth of research, 
uniformity, as far as defining the concept is almost elusive. Most theorists agree that 
the construct hinges on positive expectations of trustworthiness and willingness to 
accept vulnerability (Mollering, 2006; cited in Fulmer & Gefland, 2012). Fulmer and 
Gefland go on to describe positive expectations of trustworthiness as that which 
generally connotes perceptions, beliefs, or expectations about trustee’s intentions and 
being able to rely on the trustee. They further explain willingness to accept 
vulnerability as an intention to take risk and depend on the trustee. Trustee here 
refers to the entity to which trust is directed. Fulmer and Gefland in their review of 
trust literature encourage researchers to be emphatic on the main tenets of their 
definition of trust, so as to give a clear picture on what is being discussed and 
measured. Most importantly, in my view, they stress the need to delineate the trust 
referent with clarity. Muethel and Bond (2013) have also cautioned against lumping 
all trust referents as one, in their view this confounds results from cross-cultural 
research. This is because collectivistic cultures based on such analysis are examined 
as low on trust. However, distinguishing between in-group trust (trust in known 
persons e.g. family) and out-group trust a better account is made of findings in 
collectivistic cultures as they tend to be high on in-group trust. This finding 
highlights the importance of examining the influence of culture on trust. 
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2.1. Culture and trust 
Current research indicates marked variability in trust as a result of culture. 
Some cultural factors identified as influences on trust include socialisation goals 
(Jing & Bond, 2014), diversity (Alesina and Ferrara, 2000), emancipation (Welzel & 
Delhey, 2015) and social conflicts, informal social networks as well as life success 
(Delhey & Newton, 2003). The present work attempts to examine the influence of 
sociocultural context on trust in strangers. Specifically I investigate how perceived 
nepotism in public institutions influence trust in strangers. Nepotism revolves around 
the practise where individuals or entities with power favour only those they are 
familiar with or have vested interests in. Put simply nepotistic individuals or entities 
are rather unfair and promote inequality.  
 
Stolle (2002) comments that inequalities that exist in a society may impact trust. 
She further asserts that in order for citizens to extend trust beyond familiar others 
there should be a climate of minimal inequality. Such egalitarian cultural contexts 
that promote trust, as previously discussed, are engendered by favourable 
socioeconomic and political climates. Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) in exploring 
alternative antecedents (besides participation in voluntary associations) to trust also 
suggest that trust is influenced by economic equality, equality of opportunity as well 
as actions by governments to reduce inequality. Furthermore they propose that 
societies build trust when their political and socioeconomic climates favour 
universalistic welfare policies that treat everyone equally rather than a simple 
redistribution of wealth. These universalistic policies foster egalitarian climates by 
treating everyone in the same situation equally. Thereby leading citizens to perceive 
common stakes with each other and consequently an increase in trust. Freitag and 
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Traunmuller (2009) support this view by remarking that institutional arrangements 
that promote intolerance to corruption spurs people (citizens) toward trusting and 
trustworthy behaviour. This is because such arrangements check exploitative 
behaviour hence promoting trust. Freitag and Buhlmann (2009) have also shown that 
country features such as levels of corruption, income distribution and representation 
(of minorities) in decision-making processes are relevant to recorded levels of trust. 
These political and socioeconomic indicators outlined by Freitag and Buhlmann 
indicate that widespread corruption, inequitable income distributions and 
under-representation of minorities in the decision making process are detrimental to 
trust recorded in a society. 
 
In their study, Newton and Norris (2000) discuss three schools of thought that 
seek to explain the antecedents of how citizens’ confidence in public institutions is 
eroded. As previously examined such perceptions of public institutions are 
influential on trust. They implicate the following; social psychological features of 
individuals; the cultural environment and governmental performance. 
 
Social psychological features 
According to Newton and Norris (2000) this school examines confidence in 
institutions as formed as a result of basic aspects of personality types, which are 
enduring and heavily influence behaviour. Referring to Erikson (1950) they maintain 
that, such personality types (basic trust: trust in others and in oneself) are formed 
early in psychological development based on caregiver interaction with the infant. 
Some people are therefore likely to be trusting or mistrusting. The crux of the 
argument here is that since trust is an affective orientation based on the history of 
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personal interaction within an individual’s sphere of contact, trustworthiness 
assigned to institutions by individuals is independent of experiences with such 
institutions. Newton and Norris criticize this perspective as providing no explanation 
for changes in trust among large portions of a country’s population. They further 
note that standard survey questions on the topic reveal attributes of the individual’s 
attitude rather than the “world” they live in.  
 
The cultural environment 
This school of thought provides an alternative to the social psychological model 
(Newton & Norris, 2000). The main tenet here is that trust is a product of social 
experiences and socialization. Newton and Norris however, emphasize creating 
superordinate goals for different social types. In their opinion this breeds, among 
other things, effective and successful public institutions which people can invest 
confidence in. In summary they predicted that people who express trust toward 
others are likely to express confidence in public institutions as well.  
  
Institutional Performance  
This school favours performance of governmental institutions as influencing 
confidence rather than personality traits or social conditions (Newton & Norris, 
2000). Consequently institutions that perform will rack up more confidence than 
those who do not. This reasoning implies three assumptions and is examined follows. 
First, confidence in public institutions is an accurate gauge of public life. Second 
public institutions may lower expectations of performance in order to improve 
confidence. The third assumption is most relevant to the present study. They posit 
that institutional performance posits an indirect relationship between confidence in 
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institutions and trust at the national level. The rational here is that estimations of 
trustworthiness are based on past behaviour. The current study rests on the 
hypothesis that judgments of process i.e. equity and fairness determine such 
estimations of trustworthiness not performance. It is worthy to note that Newton and 
Norris’s prediction was for a strong relationship at the national level, which was 
confirmed in their 17 nation study, and a “not so strong one” at the individual level.  
 
The primary objective of this research is to investigate how public institutions, 
by their actions, influence individual's trust-related attitudes and behaviours directed 
at strangers. Samples are drawn from two cultural contexts: Ghana in West Africa 
and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. 
Ghana and Hong Kong present very diverse cultural contexts on the spectrum 
regarding public institutions that are effective and foster fairness as well as equality. 
The context of Hong Kong compared to Ghana presents an environment where 
fairness and equality are better safeguarded. The World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI), (2014) show this wide variability. Public institutions 
in Hong Kong compared to Ghana are perceived by citizens to be less yielding to 
corruption, enforce the rule of law and are generally more effective. Because these 
reports indicate that Hong Kong presents a less nepotistic context compared to 
Ghana, it is expected that in the present research Hong Kong will show more trust 
compared to Ghana. The WGI indices as well as the United Nations Human 
Development Report and how they aid predict expected cultural differences are 
discussed further in the research design and hypotheses chapter. This direction of 
investigation warrants the examination of the concept of culture 
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Conceptualizing culture 
One of the early definitions of culture was set forth by Herskovits (1948; cited 
in Smith & Bond, 1999), who posited that culture is the man made parts of a society. 
Smith and Bond (1999) provided an analysis for these manmade parts, dividing them 
into man-made objects (e.g. houses and transportation) and. Social Institutions (e.g. 
marriage), while highlighting that all these “parts” are governed by laws.  
 
The present study favors Hosfstede’s (1980) definition of culture, which 
explains culture as a collective programming of the mind within groups. This in my 
opinion provides a deft simplification of the concept without losing its 
meaningfulness. Culture since times of old has been passed on and spread throughout 
a society mostly through socialization. This diffusion of aspects of society to new 
members to imbibe forms what Hofstede refers to as ‘collective programming’, that 
is, members of a culture are given the appropriate tools to function, by an older 
generation, within the culture and this results in a collective way of thinking and 
behaviour because the cycle never ends. 
 
It is important to discuss about the relationship between the concepts of society 
and national culture. Rohner (1984) defines society as the largest unit of a 
territorially bonded, multigenerational population, recruited largely through sexual 
reproduction, and organized around a common culture and common social system. 
Smith and Bond (1999) propose that the concept of the nation is threatening that of 
society as the two are often used interchangeable. They draw attention to the fact that 
the concept of a nation is a western one and demarcations are mostly just for political 
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expediency. Furthermore they highlight the need to define culture holistically in 
order to retain vital elements such as ethnic, racial and linguistic distinctions.  
 
2.2. Creating a trusting environment: The role of public institutions 
As one if its main goals, the present study seeks to investigate if public 
institutions in their dealings and actions have an influence on individuals’ trust in 
strangers or people met for the first time. Current research lends credence to the 
notion that when public institutions are perceived as fair and dispassionate in 
carrying out their duties (un-nepotistic), they inspire confidence in their agencies. 
This confidence then translates into an increase in trust among individuals that 
happen to function under their jurisdiction. 
 
Confidence in public institutions is often synonymous to how trustworthy 
nationals perceive governmental institutions to be. Levi (1998) points out that trust 
or trusting is solely reserved for persons; however trustworthiness can be ascribed to 
individuals and institutions as well. Levi goes on to maintain that institutional 
trustworthiness connotes measures put in place to ensure that agents of institutions 
remain competent, credible and capable. Also these constraints are to make them 
more likely to act in the interests of those who have been asked to trust. Therefore 
when individuals place confidence in institutions they declare the belief that agents 
of such institutions will prove trustworthy. By extension the more individuals 
perceive institutions to be acting in their interests the more confidence will be placed 
in them, the converse is also true. In examining how public institutions foster 
interpersonal trust, Levi makes a point that Van Ryzin (2011) resounds (to be 
discussed later). She posits that infrastructure and resources, in other words how well 
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institutions perform, are vital but are by themselves insufficient to produce feelings 
of trustworthiness. If individuals doubt how committed institutions are to stick to 
laws and if their promises are not always guaranteed then public institutions will be 
unable secure confidence and consequently be unable to generate interpersonal trust. 
A hypothesis this study plans to examine. Levi proposes that public institutions can 
secure confidence by placing themselves in institutional arrangements that make so 
that their incentives weigh on them act in ways that benefit individuals in their 
jurisdiction above their idiosyncratic interests. In other words, public institutions can 
secure confidence by creating bureaucratic arrangements that reward competence 
and honesty in its agents (Levi & Sherman, 1997). Therefore a major source of 
distrust and consequently low confidence in public institutions according to Levi 
(1998) are promise breaking, incompetence and antagonism of agents toward the 
citizenry whom they require trust. 
 
Tying her discussion in, Levi posits that citizenry consider trustworthy public 
institutions as those whose procedures for executing duties concur with existing 
standards of fairness and is capable of credible commitments. Citizenry in her 
opinion are most likely to go along with policies they do not prefer so long as such 
policies are judged to be engendered legitimately. Levi’s arguments are given much 
weight by evidence she cites from Tyler (1990) and experimental evidence from 
Fronlich and Oppenheimer (1992) that if processes are believed to be fair and just 
even unfavorable outcomes are more likely to be accepted.  
 
Tyler (2001) in discussing the antecedents of dissatisfaction and low confidence 
in public institutions of the United States make some observations that are useful to 
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the present study. He maintains that from his research people’s evaluations of the 
legitimacy of public institutions are tied to judgments of fairness of procedures used 
by these institutions in carrying out their duties. Tyler conducted a study on the 
personal experiences of 652 citizens in Chicago, who had had recent dealings with 
the police and courts (Tyler, 1990). He explored whether perceptions of procedural 
justice influence evaluations of such procedures legitimacy. As usual, findings 
indicated the more confidence is placed in institutions when they carry out their 
duties dispassionately.  
 
Another question of relevance to the present study, as far as confidence in 
public institutions is concerned, is what elements of procedures lead to judgments of 
fairness? Tyler (2001) answers this question based on his work on people’s dealing 
with legal governmental authorities that is the police and courts. He indicated five 
judgments that influence views about fairness of these institutions. They are as 
follows: 
 
1. Favourabilty of the outcome (loss/gain) 
2. The degree to which people are given the opportunity to voice out their 
grievances. 
3. People’s trust in the motives of authorities. 
4. The degree to which people feel they are treated with respect 
5. Assessments of neutrality of governmental institutions they deal with. 
 
In Tyler’s assessment he found that ranking at the top of dimensions that 
influence judgments of fairness are; trust in the motive of authorities, the degree to 
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which people feel they were treated with respect and neutrality of the institutions. 
This he refers to as relational issues. What is noteworthy about his findings is that 
issues regarding loss or gain were nearly insignificant as far as judgments of fairness 
are concerned.   
 
As Van Ryzin (2011) notes, confidence in civil servants is important because 
“the bureaucracy is the largest arm of modern government and the one that most 
regularly interacts with citizens in their ordinary lives”. Public institutions are vital 
because, as Van Ryzin posits, governance forms a very basic fibre of society, which 
interacts with almost everyone. 
 
Van Ryzin in his empirical article (that investigated the relative influence of 
process contrasted outcomes on the perceived trustworthiness of civil servants) 
makes some notes applicable to the present study. Van Ryzin is of the view that 
current literature errs in assuming that the general public view institutions of civil 
service as more trustworthy depending on how much results they produce. Rather he 
argues that “trust in people and institutions of authority often depends more on 
process (such as fairness and equity) than on outcomes (achievements)”.  To verify 
this assertion he run an empirical study to test the whether processes or outcomes had 
an upper hand in influencing trust of civil service across 33 nations.  
 
According to Van Ryzin, defining process can become obscure because it 
sometimes ends up being confused with unnecessary bureaucracy. He further 
maintains that some situations at first glance look like “bureaucratic red tape turn 
outs”, but further analysis reveals them to be rational and fair. Van Ryzin goes on to 
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list fairness, equity, respect and honesty as the beneficial aspects of process. Tyler 
(2001) remarked that citizens in their judgment of trust and confidence in public 
institutions (trustworthiness) are much more concerned with neutrality, honesty and 
lack of bias rather than productivity though its important.  
 
The World Value Survey (WVS) provides some items that directly measure 
confidence in governmental institutions.  The survey question is as follows: 
 
I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me 
how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of 
confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? 
 
It then goes on to name a number of organizations, out of which the present 
study selects, the civil service, the police, the courts, the government and the 
parliament to represent public institutions. Preliminary analysis on Wave 5 (selecting 
Ghana and Hong Kong only) of the survey produced a Cronbach alpha of 0.72 when 
the selected items were summed to represent overall confidence in public institutions. 
The author proposes an alternative mechanism of measuring confidence in 
governmental institutions by using the organizations named on the WVS and a 
measure to assess perception of citizens’ judgment of processes employed by 
institutions. Reasoning being that if process is a better a predictor of confidence in 
governmental institutions, scores from perception of such judgments will predict the 
level of confidence in such institutions. Following findings from Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse (2002), Van Ryzin postulates that a possible reason why process is a 
better predictor of confidence and trust in public institutions is that, citizens may not 
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necessarily have the skills to judge government outcomes as lucidly as they can 
bureaucratic process, which may be experienced more realistically and attributed to 
the actions of governmental institutions. 
 
Newton and Norris (2000) note that since institutions are mostly broadly based, 
the public’s judgment of them is less likely to be affected by certain news items or 
lone events. In light of such stability, whatever level of confidence people place in 
governmental institutions may be a true indicator of their perceptions of such 
institutions and the modern world. Durkheim (1997) reiterates how embedded 
governmental institutions are in the lives of its nationals when he avers that the state 
is too remote from individuals. He notes that a society can only be maintained if 
there are secondary groups near enough to individuals to draw them into the general 
torrent of social life. Public institutions, as proposed by the present study, form such 
secondary groups.  
 
2.3. Defining trust: thoughts from McKnight and Chervany 
In an attempt to aid researchers better explore and examine empirical results 
from trust literature, McKnight and Chervany (2001) have elucidated conceptual and 
measurable ideas that provide a multidisciplinary picture of the essence of trust 
definitions. They further provide an analysis of distrust (mistrust) arguing that trust 
and distrust are separate constructs that may function together to ensure optimal 
functioning of an individual or society. 
  
As discussed earlier, current trust definitions revolve around the notion that one 
is willing to be vulnerable to others based on the assumption that they can be 
 20 
depended on. In their analysis, McKnight and Chervany make an important 
clarification, they caution researchers that saying one intends to depend on another’s 
benevolence is lumping one’s perception of an attitude with intention. They assert 
that a more adept thematic understanding of the concept must rather argue that we 
intend to depend on another person because we believe they are benevolent. 
Benevolence then becomes an antecedent to trust. This clarification becomes useful, 
as the present research looks at how cultural context may influence trust, not just the 
action but also perceptions that encourage or inhibit it. That is, how the cultural 
context creates perceptions that may direct behaviour and attitudes in certain ways. 
While McKnight and Chervany’s argument is succinct in capturing the crux of what 
trust means, they still overlook other factors that may influence how trust is ventured 
based on the context of the actors. Perception of benevolence remains crucial in 
facilitating the action of trust however; consider a scenario where individuals wish to 
ingratiate themselves to another for future reciprocity or have no trust-related 
information to go on. Taking the others benevolence into account will be important 
but even more vital will be the trustor’s initiative to take a risk in the absence of any 
evidence to speak to the trustee’s benevolence. This is when contexts become 
relevant in guiding the action of trust. Contextual variables may shape other 
perceptions that pertain to trust besides benevolence. 
 
Returning to McKnight and Chervany’s examination of the meaning of trust by 
breaking the construct down into intention and behaviour, I discuss their propositions 
in relation to the current research. First, looking at trust as an intention, they define 
trust as a willingness to depend on another with some degree of security despite the 
possibility of negative consequences and inability to exercise control over the other 
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person’s behaviour. This definition speaks to the trustor willingly accepting the risks 
that the trustee may expose them to; hence an assumption of freedom to act is present 
in trust relations. In other words, the ultimate decision to invest trust is under the full 
control of the trustor. But do contextual artefacts nudge this control? What would 
happen in when circumstances are systematically varied? The present study probes 
these important ideas by examining situation effects on trust behaviour.  
 
In McKnight and Chervany’s conceptualization, drawing from Mayer, Davis 
and Schoorman (1995), trusting viewed through the lens of intention splits into 
Willingness to Depend that is, the volition to make one’s self vulnerable to another 
absent full security. Second, is Subjective Probability of depending which Curall and 
Judge (1995) define as the degree to which one forecasts that they can depend on 
another person with relative feelings of security.  
 
Second, McKnight and Chervany explore the meaning of trust-related behaviour. 
This they explain as a person voluntarily depending on another with relative security, 
in spite of the possibility of negative consequences. Trust behaviour therefore moves 
a step further, consequently, beyond thoughts to actions that give trustee some sway 
over the trustor once trust behaviour is set in motion.  
 
Analyzing distrust, McKnight and Chervany cite Deutsch’s (1977) definition of 
the concept which is “avoiding an ambiguous path that has greater possible negative 
consequences than positive consequences”. In their opinion Deutsch’s (1958) usage 
of the word suspicion for distrust confirms their belief that he was of the view that 
the two constructs are opposites. They go on to examine the Webster and Random 
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House dictionary for definitions of distrust, suspicion, suspect and doubt. The 
conclusion arrived at was that these the terms here differ not in kind but degree. 
While this discovery throws much needed light on the fuzziness of distinguishing 
trust from distrust, an analysis of dictionary definitions may provide a pathway for 
theorizing but should not be a main means of postulating such theories. Another 
observation McKnight and Chervany make is that, trust and distrust may reside 
mutually in the same individual at the same time, for example one may trust their 
friends but distrust enemies. This forms an optimal coping strategy because in 
ambiguous situations individuals willingly rely on others but put safeguards in place 
or backups in case of unforeseen events. This conception most accurately captures 
real life.  
 
Tying the discussion in, it is worthy to note that, two schools of thought prevail 
as far as conceptualizing distrust and trust. One school holds that trust and distrust 
are two ends of a spectrum while the other is of the view that they are separate 
concepts that act as opposites. McKnight and Chervany point out that current 
conceptions of the constructs favor the latter theorizing because distrust has been 
shown (Lewicki, McAallister & Bies, 1998) not to be a low end of trust but rather 
trust can co-exist with distrust. Yamagishi and Yamagishi’s (1994) emancipation 
theory of trust best captures the coexistence of trust and distrust. They move that 
trust and commitment formation are coping strategies or alternative solutions to the 
problem of social uncertainty. The logic behind this reasoning is that social 
uncertainty cannot be avoided when we interact with others because while we seek to 
improve our lots, we inadvertently expose ourselves to the risk of being exploited. In 
their study Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) found that high trustors expressed that 
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caution is needed when dealing with others. Even though the interpretation given to 
this finding was that being prudent does not imply distrust, it still goes to show that 
the willingness to be vulnerable to another party and the need to express caution can 
coherently reside in an individual. Previous research from Geller (1966) cited by 
Yamagishi and Yamagishi also showed that, high trustors ventured only trust when 
there was no need to be cautious. When the need arose to be cautious the level of 
trust they ventured was no different from low trustors.  
 
Underlying Theories of Trust 
Trust as social exchange. 
According to Homans (1961) Social exchange is a give-and-take process, which 
is, tangible or intangible, rewarding or costly and occurs between at least two people.  
Fulmer and Gefland (2012) assert, based on previous studies, that these perspectives 
shed light on how individuals come to trust others or entities. They further explain 
that trust building is a subjective cost-benefit analysis for most people. If it is 
perceived that the exchange is imbalanced to the ones disadvantage trust is curtailed 
or ceases all together. This view supposes trust is a rational venture. Salanick and 
Pfeffer (1978) maintain that individuals form beliefs and attitudes, and in this case 
trust, through a balancing act of processing information gleaned from the social 
environment.  
 
Trust through attribution. 
Attribution theory is defined by Kelly (1973) as the theory of how people 
explain others’ behaviour. According to Fulmer and Gefland (2012), the attribution 
theory aids explain how trustors perceive the trustworthiness of the trustee.  For 
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example if the trustee’s actions are perceived to be well intentioned or generous, then 
trust will be vested.   
 
Social identity and trust. 
Finally Social identity theory is examined; (Tafjel & Turner, 1979) which is 
also essential as far as this study is concerned because the present draws samples 
from Ghana and Hong Kong. Both of which have been identified as collectivistic. 
Social identity to a large extent plays an important role in social interaction and 
provides basis for equivalence. According to Fulmer and Gefland (2012), individuals 
strive to maintain a positive view of themselves, and when trustees are seen to be 
connected to oneself, such as sharing similarities or group membership trust building 
at the interpersonal level is enhanced.  
 
2.4. Trust, Trust propensity and Trustworthiness: linkages and distinctions. 
In a meta-analytic study, Colquitt, Scott and Lepine (2007) highlight the 
distinction between trust, trustworthiness and trust propensity. Trustworthiness refers 
to the ability, benevolence and integrity of the recipient of trust. These characteristics, 
embodying trustworthiness, are regularly assessed in experimental designs by 
reciprocity, generosity or promise credibility of the recipient of trust. Yamagishi et al. 
(1999) provide experimental evidence that support the vital nature of trustworthiness 
in cases where trust is vested. In their discussion they argue that when individuals 
have decided not to invest trust (low trustors) they are generally very cautious to 
avoid being duped. Individuals who have decided to invest trust (high trustors,) on 
the other hand, in a bid to explore new but risky opportunities are sensitive to 
information pointing to the trustee’s trustworthiness. King-Casas, Tomlin, Anen, 
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Camerer, Quartz and Montague (2005) also found in a multi-round version of the 
trust game that reciprocity by one participant significantly predicted future trust 
behaviour of the other participant. They further observed this finding in neural 
responses in the dorsal striatum. This finding further emphasizes the importance of 
trustworthiness in behavioural trust dynamics. 
 
Colquitt et al. (2007) define trust propensity as the dispositional willingness to 
rely on others. Trust refers to the intention to accept vulnerability to the trustee on 
the basis of a positive expectation of their prospective actions. Colquitt and 
colleagues note that while trust has been widely explored there still no consensus as 
far as discriminating what the construct encompasses. They identify five main 
popular definitions/descriptions of the term:  
 
1. Behavioural intention (e.g., Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight, Cummings, & 
Chervany, 1998; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer 1998); 
2. Personal characteristic that inspires positive expectations of others; 
trustworthiness (e.g., Butler & Cantrell, 1984; McKnight et al., 1998); 
3. Internal action synonymous to either choosing or judging (e.g., Lewis & 
Weigert, 1985; Riker, 1971); 
4. Personality trait that gains root from childhood and remain stable through 
adulthood (e.g., Rotter, 1967; Webb & Worchel, 1986); and 
5. A form of risk-taking (Kee & Knox, 1970; Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Zand, 
1972). 
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While these schools of thought address the concept of trust from different 
angles, what is consistent in current literature is that trust (action), trustworthiness 
and trust propensity are linked but still distinct concepts. This link between these 
concepts is manifested in interactions between the trustor and the target of trust. 
Colquitt et al. (2007) found that trust propensity is positively correlated to 
perceptions of others’ trustworthiness.  
 
The finding that trustworthiness positively relates to trust has not always 
received support. Kiyonari, Yamagishi, Cook and Cheshire (2006) found in an 
experimental study using the classic one-shot trust game that the fact that an actor 
knows that trust has been invested in them would not necessarily lead them to act in 
a trustworthy manner. They however note that the one-shot trust game is limited in 
exploring trust-trustworthiness relationships, as the one-shot trust game relieves the 
trustee of the moral obligation of reciprocating. Yakovleva, Riley and Werko (2010), 
on the other hand, discovered that a person’s propensity to trust would influence both 
his/her and his/her partner’s trust. They explained that trust is reciprocated because 
the trustworthy person is conscious of being trusted and this awareness leads them to 
behave accordingly. Put alternatively if one thinks that they are trusted they will act 
in a trustworthy manner. This spurs a cycle of trusting behaviour in both partners as 
has been noted by Yakovleva et al. (2010). Therefore the effect of propensity to trust 
would be indirect once perceptions of trustworthiness have been formed.  
The present study seeks to drive the exploration even further by probing 
possibilities that may ensue under systematically controlled conditions where the 
trustworthiness is manipulated both positively and negatively. Also, exploring the 
seemingly contradictory findings of Kiyonari et al. (2006) and Yakovleva et al. 
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(2010), the present work examines the trustor’s trust behaviour. Trustworthiness, on 
the part of the trustee, has been implicated as determining whether trust will be 
displayed (by the trustor) or not. 
 
2.5. The importance of trust referents 
Muethel and Bond (2013) maintain that in cross-cultural research trust 
examined without specifying referents runs the risk of producing misleading results. 
Providing a backdrop to this claim, Muethel and Bond refer to the myriad of 
contradictory results that researchers have found in their empirical work on trust in 
collectivistic cultures. Some scholars have shown members of collectivistic cultures 
to be high on trust while others have shown collectivistic cultures to be low on trust. 
Luo (2005) is of the view that this contradiction can be clarified if a distinction is 
made between in-group trust (trust in known persons) and out-group (trust in 
unknown persons). Barber (1983) asserts that in-group trust is founded on 
relationship ties while the application of moral rules to persons outside one’s 
in-group results in out-group trust. Jing and Bond (2014) lend support to this in their 
suggestion that a general form of trust is established by generalizing from one’s level 
of in-group trust. 
Huff and Kelly (2003) in a seven-nation study comparing individualist and 
collectivist societies on organizational trust found that when trust propensity was 
conceptually distinguished into in-group and out-group trust, collectivistic societies 
showed high level of in-group trust and a low level of out-group trust. Individualistic 
societies were shown in their study to be high on out-group trust. Muethel and Bond 
(2013) have reiterated the stance by scholars that this conceptual distinction in trust 
disposition is mostly relevant when examining collective societies since the 
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distinction between in-group and out-group is more present in such societies. That 
being said, Delhey, Newton and Welzel (2011) assert that as far as group dynamics 
go, group members from all countries distinguish trusting members of the in-group 
from trusting those of the out-group. 
 
Freitag and Bauer (2013) have also investigated trust in relation to trust 
referents. While Freitag and Bauer’s discussion was to examine the ongoing debate 
regarding the cross-cultural dimensional and the measurement equivalence of social 
trust, which is still relevant to the present study, their findings relate to trust referents 
in a distinct way. They theorized that trust can be distinguished into three forms; 
namely particularized, generalized and identity-based trust. Their theory is based on 
asking if trust is a coherent syndrome of social acting or if trust is referent specific. 
According to Freitag and Bauer, trust as a coherent syndrome of social acting elicits 
equivalent levels of trust regardless of referent. Trust depending on targets elicits 
referent-specific trust. 
 
Providing insight into their proposed distinctions, particularized trust is defined 
as trust at close social range and is directed at known persons. This definition comes 
very close to in-group trust as discussed by Muethel and Bond (2013). Generalized 
trust as explained by Freitag and Bauer (2013) refers to trust directed more abstractly 
and aimed at people in general, strangers included. This definition also comes close 
to established definitions of out-group trust. Identity-based trust is directed as target 
based on perceived affiliation with a known group. This kind of trust is directed at 
targets without personal interaction and knowledge. Therefore experience with the 
group of interest plays a greater role than disposition. Identity-based trust is not 
 29 
explicitly investigated in the current analysis but the concept is worth mentioning as 
it could have an effect on both in-group and out-group trust mentioned earlier. Actors 
classified as in-group or out-group may still be tagged with an identity. This may 
cause a spillover of identity-based trust into in-group and out-group trust. Take a 
close friend for example who is of foreign nationality, where do they fall? In my 
view subjective judgments and situational circumstances of the trustee will 
ultimately be relied on as to what kind of trust is to be directed at such a person. 
However the dilemma of categorizing cannot be overlooked. 
 
2.6. Situational determinants of Trust 
While disposition remains influential in trust, research in social psychology has 
indicated situational determinants are also important. Goto (1996) has contributed to 
trust literature by examining the situational and dispositional determinants of trust. 
Goto discovered, in her study, that dispositional trust is capable of predicting specific 
trust behaviour and also the interaction of situational factors on such behaviour. She 
maintained that trust is essential to daily functioning as it provides a mental heuristic 
that enables individuals to rely on others. Goto’s study provides good insight into 
antecedents of trust by focusing on the dispositional and situational determinants. 
Nevertheless such situational determinants are highly influenced by the context 
factors therefore it is essential to investigate these elements and how they pair with 
disposition.  
 
As far as measuring of the construct (trust) goes, Goto accepts the Rotter’s 
(1967) Interpersonal Trust Scale (ITS) as critically important in measuring trust. 
However, she notes that the ITS focuses solely on dispositional trust and neglects the 
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situational role of the specific target (trustee) in trusting behaviours. It is further 
noted in Goto’s study that the ITS maintains a fairly constant social distance on 
targets (classes of significant others) in its 25 item questionnaire. She maintains that, 
the kind of target person, history of past transactions, may influence likelihood of 
engagement in trust behaviour hence the need to incorporate such factors into 
measurement. Zhang (1990) addressed this by developing the Interpersonal Trusting 
Behaviour Scale (ITBS). The ITBS measures an individual’s trust toward 20 
different target persons with respect to 18 different situations. This was to cater for 
the situational difference that may influence trust behaviour. The target persons in 
Zhang’s study clustered around intimates, acquaintances and strangers.  
 
Goto sought to effectively address the issue of clearly determining how 
situational and dispositional factors act and interact on trust behaviour. To achieve 
this, she used a measure of trust devoid of much context unlike the ITS to obtain a 
more general measure of dispositional trust and while varying types of target persons 
(intimate, acquaintance, stranger) with low or high uncertainty. The resulting model 
had participants indicate on a 7-point trustworthy/untrustworthy scale how 
trustworthy specific targets were. Vignettes were designed to accomplish this and an 
example is shown below. 
 
“During a vacation, a (FELLOW TRAVELLER, OLD HIGH SCHOOL 
CLASSMATE, BOY/GIRL FRIEND) introduces you to an exotic food of Central 
America. He reassures you that the food is the most wonderful taste in the world. He 
warns you that there is one chance in a (THOUSAND, MILLION) that the food 
maybe contaminated and this would make you seriously ill. 
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Goto makes a good attempt at separating the various antecedents of trust 
behaviour but this measure falls short of fully measuring trust behaviour. A more 
active measure of trust behaviour that requires participants to engage in some kind of 
observable action is more suitable rather than select an item on a survey. Goto also 
found that level of dispositional trust did not determine how situational uncertainty 
and social distance influenced trust.  
 
Investigating the effects of personality and situational variables on behavioural 
trust, Schlenker, Helm and Tedeschi (1973) employed certain experimental 
maneuvers and obtained findings that are pertinent to the current research. They used 
Rotter’s (1967) interpersonal trust scale as a personality measure of general trust 
level. This was done prior to conducting the study which enabled them to 
purposefully select participants that scored near the upper end (high trustors) and 
lower end (low trustors) on the interpersonal trust scale. Participants engaged in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game with simulated opponents (participants were made to 
believe these were actual people they were dealing with) so that complete control 
over simulated player behaviour was possible. The PD game used here was a points 
exchanging game where cooperation was more beneficial to players than competition, 
such that if both players cooperated they each won 4 points, if they competed they 
each lost 4 points, and if one cooperated and the other competed the cooperator lost 5 
points and the competitor gained 5 points. Participants were given the opportunity to 
exchange messages with the simulated player. These messages bordered on 
simulated players revealing their intentions regarding the choices they were going to 
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make prior to making them. The researchers varied the situation of the participant by 
making the simulated player credible or dishonest.. 
 
Findings from Schlenker et al. (1973) indicated that, high trustors relied more 
on the communication of the simulated player as they cooperated more after 
receiving a promise from the simulated player than did low trustors. Participants 
were also more cooperative after receiving highly credible promises. The situational 
variation of promise credibility however was stronger in determining cooperation, 
which is behavioural trust, than did personality score on trust. It should be noted 
however that the interaction effect of personality score on trust and credibility was 
not significant.  
 
Payne and Clark (2003) carried out empirical work to explore dispositional and 
situational determinants of trust in employees’ immediate line manager and mangers 
in the industry. They hypothesized that dispositional factors will have more of an 
impact on trust in managers in the industry while situational determinants would be 
more influential as far as trust in immediate line managers. Payne and Clark reasoned 
out these hypotheses based on the following logic. Whitner, Brodt, Korsgaard and 
Werner (1998) maintain that trusting a generalized entity will be influenced to a 
greater degree by personality and predisposition than trusting a specific entity with 
whom one may have had contact. In the latter case Whitner et al. (1998) move that 
direct experience might override basic predisposition to trust. The situational factors 
implicated by Payne and Clark include role-set satisfaction and supportive 
environment. While these situational variables are unlike what the present study 
seeks to investigate, Payne and Clark’s work provide a comparable base for the 
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present study. This is because as the present study seeks to explore how situational 
variations and context factors influence trust in strangers which is somewhat 
comparable to trusting an unknown industry manager.  
 
After running a hierarchical regression entering trait anxiety and dispositional 
trust in the first and second block respectively followed by situational variants in the 
third, it was found that disposition had a stronger effect for trust in immediate line 
managers and it remained so even after the inclusion of situational determinants. The 
prediction that situational determinants will strongly predict trust in immediate line 
managers was not supported. Results also indicated that a combination of disposition 
and situational determinants predicted trust in both types of managers. These 
findings seem within reason and the next step exploring trust is to explore such 
situation effects on trust in strangers. Fishbein and Azjen (1975) propose attitudes 
comprise three dimensions, the cognitive – information one has about an entity, 
which influences their affect about the entity and consequently how they behave. It 
therefore follows that in an unknown person, with whom an individual makes initial 
contact- a distinction Payne and Clark (2003) do not make, it would be more likely 
that situational determinants will influence cognitive judgments that trickle down to 
affect and ultimately behaviour. Finally Payne and Clark completed their 
investigation only with self-report measures, whereas the present study explores 
self-report and behavioural measures. 
 
2.7. Measuring Trust: Behaviour and Propensity 
Issues regarding lucid measurement of constructs in the behavioural sciences 
remain essential in any discussion. This debate remains because of the subjective 
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nature and multiple definitions some constructs bear across different studies. As 
stated earlier, Fulmer and Gefland (2012) suggest an arbitrary solution by calling on 
researchers to operationally define constructs of interest clearly in order not to 
confuse consumers of research. Crossing the hurdle of definition begs the question; 
how do we measure such definition? One of the concerns of Kramer (1999) was to 
move measurement of trust beyond the cognitive level to behavioural. Most studies 
measure trust by having respondents complete a questionnaire. Such assessments 
have been vital in trust literature but as Kramer (1999) noted, there is the vital need 
for measurement of a complex construct as trust beyond passive assessments, to 
more active assessments that involve participants engaging in consequential 
behaviour. Fehr, Fischbacher, Rosenbaldt, Schupp and Wagner (2003) and Naef and 
Schupp (2009) have made strides to that effect in their respective studies. 
 
Fehr et al. (2003) examined trust and trustworthiness by integrating behavioural 
experiments into representative surveys. This was done in an attempt to overcome 
the weaknesses that both approaches may present. Fehr et al. note such weaknesses 
as follows  
 
“Typically, laboratory experiments suffer from homogeneous subject pools and 
self-selection biases. The usefulness of survey data is limited by measurement error 
and by the questionability of their behavioural relevance”. 
 
The current review discusses their methodology and how it may be improved.  
Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter (2000) blazed the trail (for Fehr et al., 
2003) engendering this kind of methodology. Their study, from a sample of students, 
 35 
indicated that attitudinal trust questions do not necessarily predict actual trust 
behaviour in controlled experiments and also hints at the limitations of previous 
experiments. What’s more? Fehr et al. (2003) highlight the fact that using 
representative samples is vital in efforts to increase generalization. Attitudinal 
questions in their opinion will be a better indicator of real life behaviour when 
representative samples are employed. Furthermore Fehr et al. (2003) note that 
Glaeser et al.’s study expose the major advantage in combining surveys with 
experiments. The advantage is that such a combined study affords the opportunity for 
the accuracy of behavioural contents of survey items to be confirmed. In other words 
with relative ease survey responses can be contrasted with experimental responses. 
Fehr et al. are of the view that this combined method is not widely used because of 
the ‘separation’ of research communities with either survey or experimental 
orientations in the social sciences. 
 
The trust game designed as a social dilemma, between two players, by Berg, 
Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), is normally used to measure trust behaviour in social 
science experiments.  Fehr et al. describe it as follows: 
 
“In this game player A and player B are matched. Both are endowed with 10 
Euros. Player A can send any amount between 1 and 10 Euros to player B. The 
experimenter doubles the amount sent, that is, if A sends x Euros, player B receives 
2x Euros. After player B has been informed about the amount sent by A, B can send 
any amount between 1 and 10 Euros, which is then also doubled by the experimenter. 
Thus, if B sends y Euros to A player A receives 2y Euros. The total payoff for player 
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A is thus given by 10 – x + 2y Euros; the total payoff for B is given by 10 + 2x – y 
Euros”. 
 
The logic behind using this game as a trust measure is presented by Fehr et al. 
in the following manner. The game is a simple sequential trade under incomplete 
contract enforcement. That is for Player A, the Euros owned by B are worth twice as 
much as for B, and the opposite is true for A. In light of that both players will fare 
better if they traded but player A has to be willing to trust B to trade and B will have 
to be trustworthy. In simpler terms, the amount passed by the sender measures trust, 
“a willingness to place faith in another (at personal cost) and the amount returned to 
the sender by the trustee measures trustworthiness (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Fehr et 
al. first of all had to out-maneuver the administrative hurdle which implementing the 
game in the context of a survey presents. Without their maneuver they had to 
interview players A (first half of participants) and players B (second half of 
participants). Players B would then be informed of their corresponding player A’s 
decision after which B has to make a decision. Finally B’s decision is communicated 
to the corresponding player A. This procedure would have been necessary to 
maintain the sequential requirement of the game.  However, in their proposed 
improved design, Fehr et al. postulate a method that conducts the sequential game in 
a simultaneous fashion.  The design requires player B to make a decision for all the 
possible transfers of player A.  Player B therefore makes their decision before 
knowing the actual transfer of player A and vice versa. Players are then informed of 
actual transfers after the Ex-Post decisions of both. The actual transfer of B is 
determined by the amount sent by B in response to the actual transfer of A. The 
method employed by Fehr et al. is not without advantages and disadvantages. They 
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note that the main advantage is that it gives insight into the possible behaviours of 
player B than when they have to make a one-off decision. The main disadvantage is 
that, responding to 11 possible situations is not as emotionally arousing as being 
confronted with an actual decision. The proposed solution that is actually employed 
in their study is reported verbatim as follows: 
 
“Our method rests on the idea that the experimenters determine – based on 
previous experimental knowledge about the distribution of first mover actions – an 
ex-ante distribution of first mover actions. Every player B is confronted with a 
randomly chosen first mover action from an ex-ante distribution and he only 
responds to this randomly chosen action. For the decisions of players B and the final 
payoffs it does not play a role that the first-mover action has been randomly chosen 
from an ex-ante distribution. It is sufficient that every player B knows that he is 
matched with a randomly chosen other (anonymous) participant of the survey who 
has been assigned the role of player A. This method allows the administrators of the 
survey to simultaneously conduct the experiments with players A and B in a one-step 
procedure and to match players A and B ex-post, i.e., after all As and B’s have made 
their decisions”. 
  
The major advantage of this design, according to Fehr et al., is that it affords the 
survey-experiments combination without distorting the traditional method of 
conducting surveys.  
 
Naef and Schupp (2009) also examined the intricacies of measuring trust. They 
explored experiments and surveys in contrast and combination. As is relevant to the 
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present study, I focus on the methodology and marginally on their findings. Naef and 
Schupp employ the same method as Fehr et al. with the following variation: They 
created and used a new trust scale, containing 3 statements, in response to criticism 
of the widely used trust question in many surveys (Knack & Keefer, 1997; La Porta, 
de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; Zack & Knack, 2001). The question stated, 
“Generally speaking will you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people?” The major criticism leveled against this measure 
is that it is not correlated with trust behaviour.   
 
Naef and Schupp used the same methodology as Fehr et al. (2003). The 
significant variation was the change in survey item employed to measure trust.  
Naef and Schupp’s study further reinforce the need to combine experiments and 
survey’s to explore the correlations of trust behaviour as directed to different 
referents as well as trust propensity. The present study seeks to investigate trust 
behaviour and its correlation with the latter.  
 
The trust game just like any other method in social science has come under 
criticism. Cox (2004) is of the view that the amount sent in the trust game cannot 
clearly be distinguished from altruism. Bohnet, Greig, Hermann and Zeckhauser 
(2008) also note that the amount sent cannot pointedly mark trust from betrayal 
aversion. However the trust game is still employed by most researchers as far as 
measuring the behavioural aspects of trust. In their meta-analysis, Jonhson and 
Mislin (2011) discovered 162 replications across 35 countries. Findings showed that 
the amount sent during the trust game is influenced by random payment (i.e. only 
certain participants will be randomly chosen for payment) after engaging in the game. 
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Secondly using a simulated confederate may also influence amount sent during the 
game. Furthermore trustworthiness is influenced by two things. First, the amount by 
which the experimenter multiplies the amount sent and if participants play both the 
roles of the sender and receiver.   
 
Though the methodology used by Fehr et al. (2003) and Naef and Schupp (2009) 
provide an excellent way to investigate trust, the current research seeks to explore 
this deft methodology even further by systematically manipulating the trust referent 
to be either generous or thrifty – counting that as situational manipulation. Current 
technology affords the opportunity to do so by moving the trust game to a 
computer-based system where hypothetical players are matched with participants. 
Furthermore this study seeks to increase the turns each player has in the game 
without explicitly informing participants of the number of turns they have. This will 
aid the measurement of participants true trust behaviour at each stage of the game 
providing valuable insight on how experience and perceived predictability influences 
trust behaviour. It should however be noted that this measure, as far as the present 
study is concerned will measure trust in strangers.  
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1. Research Design 
The present study will combine an experimental and survey design to examine 
trust in strangers. In the experimental setup participants will engage in a 
computer-based trust game. A repeated measures ANOVA will be used to investigate 
behavioural differences between samples on trust in strangers.  
Experiment 
Independent variables 
The between-subjects factors will be assigned condition (i.e., dealing with a 
generous or thrifty opponent) and culture (i.e., Ghanaian and Hong Kong sample). 
The between subjects factors will serve as independent variables in the trust game.  
Dependent variables 
The within-subjects factor will be participants’ transfers of credited points 
across transactions in a multiple-round trust game. The points participants transferred 
will therefore serve as dependent variables. 
Survey 
 On the other hand, the survey was designed to capture the respondents' 
self-report trust and its psychological correlates.  
 
3.2. Cultural differences in trust between Ghana and Hong Kong: Consequences 
of cultural context 
As discussed, current literature has shown persuasive evidence of the impact of 
a society’s socioeconomic and political climates on trust among citizenry. These 
evidences suggest that societies with favourable socioeconomic and political 
climates promote contexts of trust. With regard to the socioeconomic climate, 
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high-income equality and a general perception of a move toward equal human 
development is beneficial to trust development. A political climate that insists on 
effective functioning public institutions that uphold the rule of law and intolerance to 
exploitation also encourage trust. The present study draws participants from the 
Republic of Ghana in West Africa and the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the People's Republic of China. These cultural contexts vary considerably 
on socioeconomic and political climates, with Hong Kong having a seemingly more 
favourable socioeconomic and political climate compared to Ghana. Socioeconomic 
indicators from The Human Development Report (United Nations Development 
Program, 2009) rank Hong Kong’s human development at 15 with an index of 0.891 
and a GDP per capita (Purchase Power Parity, PPP, in US dollars) of 52,383.45. 
Ghana’s human development is ranked at 138 with an index of 0.573 and a GDP per 
capita (Purchase Power Parity, PPP, in US dollars) of 3,532.33. These indicators 
show the Hong Kong context to be socioeconomically more favourable compared to 
the Ghanaian context. Political climate indicators also show a similar trend. Indices 
extracted from The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (The World Bank 
Group, 2014) show that compared to Ghana, Hong Kong experiences a stricter rule 
of law, more control over corruption and more quality public and civil services 
independent from political pressures (See Appendix 3). Altogether these indices 
show that compared to Ghana, Hong Kong presents a more favourable 
socioeconomic and political climate. Therefore in the present work, Hong Kong 
participants are expected to show a higher level of trust compared to Ghanaians.  
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World Value Survey data. 
Data obtained from representative samples in the fifth wave of the World Value 
Survey (WVS 2005-2007) also prove consistent with the previously discussed 
pattern. The data indicates that compared to Ghanaian respondents, Hong Kong 
Chinese respondents reported a higher level of trust. This assessment is derived from 
a WVS item, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you need to be careful when dealing with people?” The item in question has 
been employed by a number of studies to investigate general trust. Regarding public 
institutions, data from the fifth wave of the world value survey also show that 
compared to Ghanaian respondents, Hong Kong Chinese respondents indicate a 
greater confidence in public institutions such as the civil services, the government 
and, parliament (legislative council in Hong Kong) (See Appendix 2).  
 
Hypotheses. 
Research questions presented in the Introduction are probed with the following 
hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested in the present study based on the literature 
and background presented.  
 
1. What are the behavioural and self-report features of trust in strangers among 
Ghanaians and Hong Kong Chinese? How are these features related to one another? 
 
Since Hong Kong Chinese function in a more favourable socioeconomic and 
political climate it is expected that, Hong Kong Chinese students will score higher 
than Ghanaian students on behavioural (Hypothesis 1a) and self-report (Hypothesis 
1b) trust in strangers. Current literature indicates that trustworthiness (e.g. Schlenker 
 43 
et al., 1973; Yamagishi et al., 1999; King-Casas et. al, 2005) has significant impact 
on trust. In that regard, manipulating reciprocity by making an opponent (in the trust 
game) generous (more trustworthy) or thrifty (less trustworthy) is expected to have a 
significant influence on behavioural trust. Participants encountering a generous 
opponent will therefore invest more trust compared to those encountering a thrifty 
opponent in a trust game (Hypothesis 1c). Finally, as ones tendency is expected to 
guide action, self-report and behavioural trust in strangers are expected to be 
positively related (Hypothesis 1d). Hypothesis 1(a, b, c & d) examines the nature of 
and relationships between self-report and behavioural trust in strangers.  
 
As previously discussed fair and egalitarian public institutions are an important 
influence on trust in strangers. In that regard, the influence of perceived nepotism in 
public institutions will be explored as a potent explanation for expected cultural 
differences in trust in strangers. 
 
2. Do public institutions create an environment that influence trust in strangers? 
How does perceived nepotism in public institutions provide this influence? 
 
Since Hong Kong Chinese seem to be functioning in more favourable political 
climate compared to Ghanaians it is expected that Ghanaian students will report a 
higher perception of nepotism in public institutions than Hong Kong Chinese 
students (Hypothesis 2a). Based on previously discussed evidence  (e.g. Freitag & 
Buhlmann, 2009; Freitag & Traunmuller, 2009) that point to the influence cultural 
contexts on trust, perceived nepotism in public institutions is proposed to explain 
cultural differences in behavioural (Hypothesis 2b) and self-report (Hypothesis 2c) 
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trust in strangers. Hypothesis 2 therefore explores the influential role of public 
institutions on trust in strangers 
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CHAPTER 4 METHOD 
 
4.1. Participant demographics 
314 university students were recruited for the present study. The Hong Kong 
sample consisted of 50 male and 140 female students from Lingnan University, with 
age ranging from 17 to 25 years (M = 20.1, SD = 1.41). The Ghanaian sample 
consisted of 57 male and 67 female students from University of Ghana, with age 
ranging from 18 to 30 years (M = 21.99, SD = 2.32).  
 
4.2. Measures 
Behavioural trust 
Computer-based trust game. 
The trust game is designed to assess behavioural trust based on Naef and 
Schupp’s (2009) simplified version as described below: 
 
“The design of the simplified trust game is as follows. Two players are each 
endowed with 10 euros. The first mover decides how many of his or her 10 euros he 
or she would like to transfer to the second mover. The experimenters double each 
transfer. The second mover then gets to know the first mover's transfer and then 
decides him or herself about the back-transfer. As with the first mover, the second 
mover can transfer any amount between zero and ten euros. The second mover's 
transfer is doubled as well”.  
 
The first mover’s transfer (Player A) provides a measure of trust behaviour since 
they take the initial risk with the belief that the second mover (Player B) will 
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reciprocate. Player B’s transfer provides a measure of trustworthy behaviour. After a 
stipulated number of transfers, the game is over and participants are sometimes paid 
what they earned. Payment is usually dependent on the type of study and resources 
available to the experimenter. 
 
I conceived the concept for an intelligent computer-based trust game, to 
measure trust behaviour toward people met for the first time, after an examination of 
Fehr et al. (2002). In their study Fehr et al. proposed an ex post facto version of the 
trust game where every player B is confronted with a randomly chosen player A 
from an ex-ante distribution. Player B is then to determine their actions based on 
player A’s already provided responses. In the present study, participants are paired 
with simulated players in a computer-based game designed to produce manipulated 
actions of a “Player B” depending on the experimental condition. Manipulated 
actions of Player B constituted systematically varying the characteristics of simulated 
player to either be generous or thrifty.  
 
Generous opponent condition: Simulated player with the following programmed 
configuration for transfers at each stage. 
    Participant transfer + 2 
Thrifty opponent condition: Simulated player with the following programmed 
configuration for transfers at each stage. 
             Participants transfer – 2 
        If participant transfer < or = 2, simulated player transfers 0 
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This afforded the administrative opportunity to merge a survey with an experiment. 
The trust game and survey were both computer-based. All participants took on the 
role of Player A because trust behaviour was of prime interest in the present study.  
 
 Manipulation checks of the trust game. 
 Manipulation checks were put in place to assess the efficacy of the 
computer-based trust game. Participants were to rate how real and generous they 
perceived their opponent to be. Both perceived reality and generosity of the opponent 
was to be rated on ten-point scale. The scale ranged from 0-10. 0 indicating the 
lowest perceived of reality and generosity and 10 indicating the highest level of 
perceived reality and generosity. 
 
Self-report trust 
Since the official language of Ghana is English, and university students in the 
country are required to be competent in its usage, all measures used, for the 
Ghanaian sample, were in English. As the official languages of Hong Kong are 
Chinese and English, a Chinese-English bilingual version of the survey was used for 
the Hong Kong sample. Back translation was used to ensure equivalence between 
English and Chinese versions of the instruments (Brislin, 1986). 
 
Targeted trust. 
This scale was modeled from five items on trust in the WVS (2005-2007) and 
rated on a five-point Likert scale. Participants were asked to indicate the level of 
trust they had in certain entities. These entities included family, people known 
personally, people met for the first time, people of another nationality and people of 
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another religion. Ratings ranged from 1 (do not trust at all) to 5 (trust completely). 
Trust in people met for the first time was adopted as the measure of trust in strangers. 
 
Self-report measures on public institutions 
Perception of nepotism in public institutions. 
This scale was modeled from an item (rated on a five-point Likert scale) used in 
the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP 2006) role of governance survey.  
 
Do you think that the treatment people get from public officials in [Respondents 
Country] depends on whom they know? 
 
The aforementioned question was asked of the police, courts, legislative council, 
the government and the civil service, with public officials being replaced by these 
various entities. Participants rated the extent to which they perceived public 
institutions to be nepotistic. Ratings ranged from 1(definitely does) to 5(definitely 
does not). Scores were reversed such that high scores will indicate high perception of 
nepotism and low scores indicate low perception of nepotism. The aggregated ratings 
of the five institutions constituted the scale. (α = .69 for Hong Kong Chinese and .78 
for Ghanaians) 
 
4.3. Procedure 
Participants were recruited through email announcements and advertisement on 
both university campuses. A total of 314 undergraduate students (Ghana = 124, Hong 
Kong = 190) participated in the current study. The same experimental protocols were 
employed in Ghana and Hong Kong.  
 49 
 Upon arrival at the study site, participants were directed to sit at a computer and 
log on. A URL that gave access to the study was then provided. After reading and 
completing a consent form, they then accessed the trust game. The game was 
designed to randomly assign participants to either engage a generous or thrifty 
opponent. They were then presented instructions and a tutorial on the trust game 
(training phase) before they proceeded to play the game. To reduce the chance of 
revealing the actual purpose of the research, participants were told that they were 
engaging in a points exchange game which explores student investment behaviour. 
They were also told that they were playing the game with another participant who 
was taking part in the study at the same time as they were. To induce feelings of 
ownership of the points they earn in the game, participants were told that they may 
receive a prize at the end of the study depending on the number of points they had 
upon completion (Lount, 2010). See Appendix 5 for instructions and a screenshot of 
the trust game.  
  
 With an initial 10 points to begin with, participants had three turns to transfer 
their desired number of points to the simulated player who did same at every stage. 
However, participants did not know they had three transfer opportunities. In order to 
increase the impression that the simulated players were real, a 10-second delay was 
put on the time it took simulated players to make their transfers. Following Naef and 
Schupp (2009), all transferred points were doubled. After each transfer, participants 
were able to view the number of points the simulated opponent returned to them, 
what they received after it was doubled, the number of points they had in total, and 
the number of points the simulated player had in total. The game automatically came 
to an end after the third transfer, with a summary of all transfers that had taken place 
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during the game. Unlike in Berg et al.’s (1995) classic trust game transfers (in the 
present study) were increased to three for two reasons. First, seldom do real life 
interactions have classic one-off interactions. Second, the effects of manipulating 
trustworthiness (as manipulated via opponent generosity in the present study) may be 
assessed in a multi-round trust game. Also current literature (e.g. King-Casas, 
Tomlin, Anen, Camerer, Quartz and Montague, 2005) indicates trustworthiness is 
most crucial in eliciting trust behaviour. Stipulated number of transfers has not been 
shown to influence how trust behaviour is elicited. The choice of three therefore 
presents a concise choice to assess trust behaviour.   
 
 After the trust game, another URL was provided to participants to access and 
complete the survey. The survey was placed after the trust game to avoid participants 
relating their experimental decisions to ideas involving trust (Bellemare & Kroger, 
2003). Upon completion of the survey, participants were thanked for their 
participation in the study. Participants in Hong Kong were compensated with 30 
Hong Kong dollars. After all sessions were completed, participants were fully 
debriefed on the purpose of the study and were informed that no additional prize will 
be received.  
 
 Hong Kong participants were compensated for their participation because 
current practice in Hong Kong is such that most research projects compensate 
volunteers for their time. Conversely, research projects in Ghana do not typically 
provide compensation for volunteers. In that regard and due to resource constraints, 
compensation was not provided to Ghanaian volunteers. Furthermore, the provision 
of compensation for Ghanaian research projects is likely to attract volunteers who 
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fall within the lower economic status of the population and dissuade volunteers in the 
upper economic status of the population. 
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS 
5. The nature of and relationship between behavioural and self-report trust in 
strangers. 
The computer-based trust game modeled from Naef and Schupp’s (2009) 
version of Berg et al.’s (1995) classic trust game assessed behavioural trust in 
strangers. During the trust game participants were randomly assigned to interact with 
either a generous or thrifty opponent.  Table 1 shows statistics of the random 
assignment in both samples. 
 
Table 1 
Trust game conditions  
 Conditions  
 Thrifty opponent Generous opponent Total 
Hong Kong 91 99 190 
Ghana 62 62 124 
Total 153 161 314 
 
 
Manipulation checks 
Perceived reality of the simulated player.  
There was no significant difference in the opponent’s perceived reality between 
the two samples regardless of condition (i.e. Thrifty opponent vs. Generous 
opponent). Hong Kong: Thrifty opponent (M = 3.64, SE = 0.28), Generous opponent 
(M = 3.48, SE = 0.24), t(188) = .422, p > .05. Ghana: Thrifty opponent (M = 1.81, 
SE = 0.25), Generous opponent (M = 1.86, SE = .024), t(122) = -.558, p > .05. This 
indicates that with regard to how real participants perceived their opponent to be no 
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significant differences were found between the generous and thrifty opponent 
conditions, in both samples. 
 
Perceived generosity of opponent. 
Regarding simulated player characteristics, a significant difference in perceived 
opponent generosity between conditions was observed in both samples. As predicted, 
participants in the generous opponent condition rated the simulated player as more 
generous compared to participants in the thrifty opponent condition. Hong Kong: 
Thrifty opponent condition (M = 2.97, SE = 0.31), Generous opponent condition (M 
= 6.00, SE = .026), t(188) = -7.55, p < .05, d = -1.10. Ghana: Thrifty opponent 
condition (M = 2.63, SE = 0.31), Generous opponent condition (M = 3.56, SE = .029) 
t(122) = -2.19, p < .05, d = -.39. These results indicate that participants’ perceptions 
were consistent with assigned conditions. In both samples, participants in the 
generous conditions perceived their opponent to be more generous compared to those 
in the thrifty conditions. 
 
5.1. Cultural difference in trust behaviour 
In order to explore the effect of conditions (dealing with a thrifty or generous 
opponent) on trust behaviour toward strangers (transfers during the game), a repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted. Culture (i.e. Ghana and Hong Kong samples) and 
Conditions (i.e., Thrifty opponent conditions vs. Generous opponent conditions) 
were the between-subjects factors (independent variables) and participants’ transfers 
(1-3) during the game were the within-subjects factor (dependent variable). Pillai’s 
trace multivariate test showed that the Transfers x Condition x Culture interaction 
was not significant: V = 0.005, F(2, 309) = 0.75, p > .05. However, Pillai’s trace 
 54 
multivariate tests indicated significant main effects for transfers: V = 0.09, F(2, 309) 
= 15.22, p < .0001. This indicates that the three transfers participants made (in both 
samples) in the trust game were significantly different from each other. Pairwise 
comparisons using a Bonferonni adjustment indicated significant differences 
between transfers 1, 2 and 3 (See Appendix 1). Transfers x Culture interaction was 
also significant V = 0.02, F(2, 309) = 3.70, p < .05. This shows that transfers made 
by the Ghanaian sample were significantly different from transfers made by the 
Hong Kong sample. The Ghanaian sample transferred more points across all 
transfers than the Hong Kong sample (See Table 2). Hypothesis 1a which predicted 
that Hong Kong Chinese will score higher on behavioural trust than Ghanaians was 
not supported.  Finally, Transfers x Condition interaction was also significant V = 
0.15, F(2, 309) = 27.66, p < .0001, indicating that interacting with a generous or 
thrifty opponent significantly impacted transfers. Participants dealing with a 
generous opponent transferred more points than those dealing with a thrifty opponent 
(See Table 2). Hypothesis 1c, which stated that participants encountering a generous 
opponent would invest more trust compared to those encountering thrifty opponent, 
was supported.  
 
Tests of between-subjects effects indicated a non-significant Culture x 
Condition interaction F(1, 310) = .83, p > .05. The main effect of Culture yielded a 
significant F ratio of F(1, 310) = 14.94, p < .0001, indicating that the mean score for 
transfers in the Ghanaian sample was higher than that of the Hong Kong sample (See 
Table 2). The main effect of condition also yielded an F ratio of F(1, 310) = 33.48, p 
< .0001. This showed that participants in the generous opponent condition 
transferred more points than those in the thrifty opponent condition. 
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Descriptive statistics, including means and standard deviations of transfers for 
both conditions in both samples are presented in Table 2. Profile plots of culture x 
transfers interaction for both conditions are presented in Figure 1 and, Figure 2. Data 
in Table 2 as well as Figures 1 and 2 show that regardless of whether the opponent 
was generous or thrifty, participants in Ghana always transferred more points than 
participants in Hong Kong. 
Table 2  
Means and Standard Deviations of number of points being transferred across 
Conditions in the two samples 
  Thrifty opponent 
Condition 
Generous opponent 
Condition 
  M SD M SD 
 
Hong Kong 
Transfer 1 3.48 1.84 3.53 2.09 
Transfer 2 2.98 2.25 4.61 3.91 
Transfer 3 2.41 1.93 6.45 6.27 
 Total 8.87 6.02 14.59 12.27 
 
Ghana 
Transfer 1 4.23 2.34 4.26 2.44 
Transfer 2 3.98 2.86 6.16 4.72 
Transfer 3 4.13 4.15 9.79 10.32 
 Total 12.34 9.35 20.21 17.48 
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Figure 1. Profile plot of Culture x Transfers for the thrifty opponent condition  
 
 
Figure 2. Profile plot of Culture x Transfers for the generous opponent condition 
 
Country-specific results indicated significant transfer main effects and transfer x 
condition interaction effects for both samples.  In the Hong Kong sample: Transfer 
main effects: V = 0.04, F(2, 187) = 3.86, p < .05, ηp2 = .04, this shows that transfers 
(1 - 3) were significantly different from each other.  Transfer x Condition 
interaction was also significant: V = 0.17, F(2, 187) = 18.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .17, 
indicating that participants in the generous opponent condition transferred more 
points than those in the thrifty opponent condition. For the Ghanaian sample: 
Transfer main effects: V = 0.13, F(2, 121) = 9.07, p < .001, ηp2 = .13, , this shows 
that transfers (1 - 3) were significantly different from each other. Transfer x 
Condition interaction was also significant: V = 0.14, F(2, 121) = 10.01, p < .001, ηp2 
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= .14, indicating that participants in the generous opponent condition transferred 
more points than those in the thrifty opponent condition. 
 
Summary of behavioural trust in strangers. 
Overall, results on the nature of behavioural trust in strangers suggest that the 
Ghanaian sample expressed more behaviour trust than the Hong Kong sample. 
Hypothesis 1a was therefore not supported. With regard to reciprocity or 
trustworthiness of the stranger as manipulated by generosity, dealing with a generous 
opponent elicited more trust than dealing with a thrifty opponent. Hypothesis 1c was 
supported by the results. 
 
5.2. Cultural difference in self-report trust 
The nature of trust in strangers. 
In order to explore how the samples under study conceptualize trust in strangers, 
a principal axis factor analysis was conducted on the targeted trust scale. This was to 
ascertain the nature of trust in strangers (as assessed with trust in people met for the 
first time) in the respective samples. 
 
Ghana 
The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure, KMO = .59 (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999) 
indicated that the sample size was satisfactory for the current analysis. An initial 
eigenvalue led analysis pointed to two factors that accounted for 76.24% of the 
variance. Factor loadings after rotation are a reported in Table 3. Trust in people met 
for the first time clustered with trust in family and trust in people known personally 
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on the first factor. Trust in people of another religion and, trust in people of another 
nationality clustered on factor 2. 
 
Table 3 
Factor structure of targeted trust items in the Ghana sample 
 Factor 1 
Factor Variance = 40.35 
Factor 2 
Factor Variance = 35.89 
Trust in your family .88  
Trust in people you know 
personally 
.84  
Trust in people met for the 
first time 
.73  
Trust in people of another 
religion 
 .93 
Trust in people of another 
nationality 
 .92 
 
Hong Kong 
The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure, KMO = .61 (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999) 
indicated that the sample size was satisfactory for the current analysis. An initial 
eigenvalue led analysis pointed to two factors that accounted for 63.30% of the 
variance. Factor loadings after rotation are a reported in Table 4. Trust in people met 
for the first time clustered with trust in people of another religion and, trust in people 
of another nationality on the first factor. Trust in family and trust in people known 
personally clustered on the second factor. 
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Table 4 
Factor structure of targeted trust items in the Hong Kong sample 
 Factor 1 
Factor Variance = 36.58 
Factor 2 
Factor Variance = 26.72 
Trust in people of another 
religion 
.79  
Trust in people of another 
nationality 
.74  
Trust in people met for the 
first time 
.72  
Trust in your family  .89 
Trust in people you know 
personally 
.37 .72 
 
The pattern of results from the exploratory factor analysis suggests that the 
samples under study conceive self-report trust in strangers differently from each 
other. In the Ghanaian sample, self-report trust in strangers associated with trust in 
family and people known personally. This suggests that when Ghanaians conceive 
self-report trust in strangers, the notion is associated with familiar others. The Hong 
Kong sample on the other hand associated self-report trust in strangers with trust in 
people of another nationality and people of another religion. This suggests that when 
Hong Kong Chinese conceive self-report trust in strangers, the notion is associated 
with unfamiliar others. 
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Comparison of self-report trust in strangers 
In order to compare self-report trust in strangers between Ghanaian and Hong 
Kong Chinese respondents an independent samples t-test was conducted. This test 
was statistically significant t(312) = -6.26, p < .0001; d = -.33. These results indicate 
that Hong Kong Chinese (M = 2.61, SD = .76) reported a higher level of self-report 
trust in strangers than Ghanaians (M = 2.04, SD = .83). Hypothesis 1b; which stated 
that Hong Kong Chinese would score higher on self-report trust in strangers than 
Ghanaians was supported. 
 
Summary of the results on self-report trust. 
Overall, results from self-report trust suggest that in the present samples, 
Ghanaians and Hong Kong Chinese conceive self-report trust in strangers differently. 
Ghanaian seem to associate trust in strangers with familiar others while Hong Kong 
Chinese associate trust in strangers with unfamiliar others. Also Hong Kong Chinese 
scored higher on self-report trust in strangers compared to Ghanaians. Hypothesis 1b 
was therefore supported.  
 
5.5. The mediating role of perceived nepotism in public institutions in the 
relationship between culture and trust in strangers. 
 
Comparison of perceived nepotism in public institutions 
An initial comparison of levels of perceived nepotism in public institutions 
between Ghanaian and Hong Kong Chinese respondents an independent samples 
t-test was conducted. This test was statistically significant t(312) = 5.45, p < .0001; d 
= .62. These results indicate that Ghanaians (M = 17.91, SD = 3.35) expressed a 
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higher level of perceived nepotism in public institutions than Hong Kong Chinese (M 
= 15.91, SD = 3.09). Hypothesis 2a; which stated that Ghanaians would report a 
higher perceived nepotism in public institutions was supported 
 
Self-report trust in strangers 
The mediating role of perceived nepotism in public institutions in the 
relationship between culture and self-report trust in strangers was examined. This 
was done to explain observed cultural differences in self-report trust in strangers. 
Procedures proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) to test indirect effects 
were used. This approach was adopted over the more commonly used Baron and 
Kenny (1986) method as its more prone to low statistical power in small samples 
(MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West & Sheets, 2002). The Baron and Kenny 
method requires the X-Y relation to be significant. The challenge that may arise here 
is that, the coefficient may not be significant because of low statistical power even 
though a significant effect exists in the population. Baron and Kenny’s approach is 
less favourable in this case as it results in a Type II error (Preacher & Hayes 2004). 
Also the Sobel test, which is usually used to test for significance of indirect effects, 
requires estimates of the indirect effect to be normally distributed. This rarely occurs 
in small samples. Preacher and Hayes’s (2004) bootstrapping procedure evades this 
problem, as it makes no assumptions about sampling distributions of estimates of 
effects. This bootstrapping strategy produces estimates of the direct effect of X on Y 
after entering the mediator(s), the indirect effect of X on Y via the mediator as well 
as the total effect of X on Y. 
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The SPSS macro designed by Hayes (2014) was used to assess the proposed 
mediation model. With the Hong Kong sample as the reference group Culture was 
positively related to trust in strangers (b = .33, t (312) = 6.26, p < .0001). Culture was 
negatively related to perception of nepotism in public institutions (b = -.30, t (312) = 
-5.45, p < .0001). Perception of nepotism among public institutions was negatively 
related to trust in strangers (b = -.13, t (312) = -2.32, p < .05). A bias corrected 
bootstrap 95% confidence interval of the indirect effect was obtained with 5000 
bootstrapped samples. Results of the mediation analysis confirmed the mediating 
role of perception of nepotism in public institutions in the relation between culture 
and trust in people met for the first time (b = .06, CI = .01 to .13). Furthermore 
results showed that the direct effect of culture was reduced (b = .30, t (311) = 5.34, p 
> .0001) when controlling for perception of nepotism in public institutions. Results 
are displayed in Figure 4. 
 
These results indicate that the observed difference between Ghanaian and Hong 
Kong Chinese respondents in self-report trust in strangers is partially explained by 
perceived nepotism in public institutions. Hypothesis 2c which proposed perceived 
nepotism as a potent mediator in the relationship between culture and self-report trust 
in strangers was therefore supported. 
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*p < .05, **p < .0001 
Figure 3. Indirect effect of culture on trust in strangers through perception of 
nepotism in public institutions. 
  
Behavioural trust in strangers 
Hypothesis 1a which predicted that Hong Kong Chinese will show a more 
behavioural trust compared to Ghanaians was not supported. Results from the 
repeated measures ANOVA showed that Ghanaians rather expressed higher 
behavioural trust compared to Hong Kong Chinese. Secondly, consistent with 
prediction Ghanaians compared to Hong Kong Chinese reported a higher perception 
of nepotism in their public institutions. Finally coherent as well as significant 
relationships were not found between self-report and behavioural trust in strangers, 
and perceived nepotism in public institutions. The pattern of these results ruled out 
the possibility of perceived nepotism in public institutions meaningfully explaining 
observed cultural differences in behavioural trust in strangers (Hypothesis 2b). 
Hypothesis 2b was therefore not supported. 
 
 
Culture  Trust in 
strangers 
Perception of 
nepotism in 
public 
institutions 
.33** 
(.30)** 
-.30** 
-.13* 
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The relationship between behavioural and self-report trust in strangers 
and perceived nepotism in public institutions. 
The relationships between behavioural and self-report trust in strangers as well 
as relationships with perceived nepotism in public institutions are presented in Table 
5. 
Table 5  
Correlation matrix of self-report and behavioural and measures 
 P_NP T_PP T1 T2 T3 
P_NP 
1  
   
ITP (-.496**) 
-.262** 
 
   
C_PB (-.555**) 
-.391** 
 
   
T_PP (-.247**) 
-.041 
1 
   
T1 (-.007) 
-.067 
(-.009) 
.016 
1   
T2 (-.097) 
-.078 
(-.003) 
.040 
(.581**) 
.580** 
1  
T3 (-.175) 
-.035 
(.054) 
.029 
(.435**) 
.248** 
(.829**) 
.591** 
1 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01. Coefficients in parenthesis are correlations for the Ghana 
sample; coefficients without parenthesis are for the Hong Kong sample. 
P_NP = Perception of nepotism in public institutions T_PP = Trust in people 
met for the first time (strangers); T1 = Transfer1; T2 = Transfer2; and T3 = 
Transfer3. 
 
Results presented in the correlation matrix show no significant relationships 
between self-report trust in strangers (T_PP) and behavioural trust in strangers (T1, 
T2 & T3). This indicates that self-report trust in strangers had no significant 
influence on behavioural trust in strangers. Hypothesis 1d, which stated that 
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self-report and behavioural trust in strangers would be positively related, was not 
supported. Perceived nepotism in public institutions was significantly and negatively 
related to self-report trust in strangers in Ghana. In the Hong Kong sample, perceived 
nepotism in public institutions was negatively related to self-report trust in strangers 
but the relationship was not significant. These results indicate that in both samples, 
low levels of perceived nepotism in public institutions leads to high self-report trust 
in strangers. It should be noted that this relationship was statistically significant in 
the Ghanaian sample not the Hong Kong Chinese sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 66 
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
6.1. Behavioural and self-report trust in strangers across cultures 
 The present study presented results on behavioural (computerized web-based 
trust game) and self-report (survey) trust in strangers. Combining an experiment and 
a survey afforded the opportunity to merge the advantages of experimental and 
survey design.  
 
Manipulation checks on computer-based trust game 
Manipulation checks from the trust game indicated that participants from both 
samples were not entirely convinced that they have dealt with an actual person. 
Nonetheless, this perceived reality did not predict trust trust behaviour (Ghana: b 
= .12, t(122) = 1.28, p > .05; Hong Kong: b = .11, t(188) = 1.50, p > .05). The Ghana 
sample reported a lower belief compared to the Hong Kong sample, although 
participant ratings of simulated player characteristics were consistent with the 
conditions to which they were randomly assigned. The simulated player in the 
generous opponent condition was rated more generous compared to the thrifty 
opponent condition. Again participants in the Hong Kong sample gave a higher 
rating of generosity, to the simulated player, compared to the Ghana sample.  
 
Summary of main findings 
Contrary to prediction, participants in the Ghanaian sample vested more 
behavioural trust, regardless of condition, than participants in the Hong Kong sample. 
Behavioural trust also showed that participants encountering a generous opponent, 
vested more trust compared to participants encountering a thrifty opponent. 
Self-report trust showed opposite results. Hong Kong participants reported a higher 
 67 
level of self-report trust compared to Ghanaians. As well, Hong Kong participants 
reported a lower level of perceived nepotism in their public institutions compared to 
Ghanaians.  
 
Relationships between self-report and behavioural measures showed the 
following results. The behavioural trust measures did not correlate meaningfully with 
the self-report trust measure and perceived nepotism in public institutions. 
Self-report trust in strangers was negatively related to perceived nepotism in public 
institutions as expected. As hypothesized, perceived nepotism in public institutions 
explained observed cultural differences in self-report trust in strangers. The present 
data was unable to explain observed cultural differences in behavioural trust. This 
was due to the inconsistent pattern of behavioural trust differences. Contrary to 
prediction Ghanaian students expressed more behavioural trust compared to Hong 
Kong students Also Ghanaian students reported a higher perceived nepotism in 
public institutions compared to Ghanaians. Furthermore correlations revealed no 
significant relationships between behavioural trust and perceived nepotism in public 
institutions. This ruled out perceived nepotism as a coherent mediator of cultural 
differences in behavioural trust in strangers.  
 
6.1.1. The nature of and relationship between behavioural and self-report 
trust in strangers 
Experimental decisions of trust (transfers during the trust game) showed that 
Ghanaian participants vested more behavioural trust, regardless of condition, than 
participants in the Hong Kong sample. This finding was contrary to initial prediction 
that Hong Kong Chinese participants will show more behavioural trust. Also, 
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participants encountering a generous opponent, in both samples, showed more trust 
compared to those encountering a thrifty opponent. This supported the hypothesis 
that reciprocity or trustworthiness as manipulated by generosity of the opponent will 
have significant impact on trust behaviour in strangers. 
 
Self-report trust in strangers as assessed by trust in people met for the first time 
showed different conceptualization across samples. Results of the exploratory factor 
analysis on the targeted trust items revealed notable differences between samples. In 
the Ghanaian sample, trust in strangers is associated with trust in family and trust in 
people known personally; in the Hong Kong sample, trust in strangers is associated 
with trust in people of another nationality and trust in people of another religion. 
These results suggest that, Ghanaians associate trust in strangers with familiar others. 
Hong Kong Chinese, on the other hand associate, trust in strangers with unfamiliar 
others. This finding may give an indication as to why the Ghanaian sample ended up 
expressing more behavioural trust than Hong Kong Chinese. Associating trust in 
strangers with familiar others may have induced Ghanaian participants to express 
more behavioural trust while associating trust in strangers with unfamiliar others 
may have induced Hong Kong participants to express less behavioural trust. 
Comparing self-report trust in strangers between samples showed Hong Kong 
Chinese to report a higher level of trust in strangers than Ghanaians. This finding 
was consistent with initial prediction. Indicating that compared to Ghanaians Hong 
Kong Chinese report a higher tendency to trust strangers.  
Results from correlational analyses also indicated no significant relationships 
between self-report and behavioural trust in strangers. Indicating that trust tendency 
in strangers as assessed by self-report trust in strangers had no significant influence 
 69 
on behavioural trust in strangers. The proposed hypothesis that tendency will guide 
action to result in self-report and behavioural trust being positively related was not 
supported. Indicating that, in the present samples, the tendency to trust strangers did 
not associate or have any significant influence on actual behavioural trust in 
strangers. Different influences driving self-report trust and behavioural trust in may 
have produced this pattern. It is possible that the design of the trust game strips away 
all other contextual effects (e.g. nepotism in public institutions) besides the 
characteristics of the opponent being interacted with. Self-reporting by survey design 
on the other hand is able to retain contextual effects. 
 
6.1.2. Perceived nepotism and confidence in public institutions 
 Significant differences between the Ghanaian and Hong Kong Chinese samples 
were found in perceived nepotism and confidence in public institutions. Results 
showed that Ghanaians reported a higher level of perceived nepotism in their public 
institutions compared to Hong Kong Chinese. This finding supported the initially 
proposed hypothesis. Furthermore, Ghanaians reported a lower level of confidence in 
their public institutions than their Hong Kong Chinese counterparts. Generally these 
results show that compared to Ghanaians, Hong Kong Chinese regard their public 
institutions to be fair and egalitarian in their dealings. In both samples perceived 
nepotism was found to be negatively related to self-report trust in strangers. 
Indicating that, low levels of perceived nepotism was associated with high levels of 
self-report trust in strangers. This suggests that fair and egalitarian public institutions 
foster trust in strangers. It should be noted that this relationship was statistically 
significant in the Ghanaian sample alone. The nature of results regarding perceived 
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nepotism in public institutions suggests that perceived nepotism in public institutions 
has more of an effect on trust in strangers in the Ghanaian sample.  
 
6.1.3. Explaining cultural differences in self-report and behavioural trust  
Self-report trust in strangers 
Mediational analysis was used to explain observed cultural differences in 
self-report trust in strangers. The initial hypothesis proposed perceived nepotism in 
public institutions to mediate the relationship between culture and trust in strangers. 
This hypothesis received support as perceived nepotism in public institutions 
partially mediated the relationship between culture and trust in strangers. This 
suggests that, in the samples under study, differences in reported trust in strangers 
are partially explained by how fair and egalitarian public institutions are perceived to 
be. Therefore Hong Kong Chinese participants reported a higher self-report trust in 
strangers compared to Ghanaians because Hong Kong Chinese regard their public 
institutions to be more fair and egalitarian in their dealings. This perception of public 
institutions as fair and egalitarian therefore encourages trust in strangers. 
 
Behavioural trust in strangers 
Results from behavioural trust in strangers presented some counterintuitive 
results. It was proposed that Hong Kong Chinese will express more behavioural trust 
compared to Ghanaians. This hypothesis was not supported as Ghanaians expressed a 
higher level of behavioural trust compared to Hong Kong Chinese. Additionally, 
Ghanaians reported a higher level of perceived nepotism in their public institutions 
than Hong Kong Chinese reported in theirs as initially predicted. Indicating that 
compared to Hong Kong Chinese, Ghanaians regard their public institutions to be 
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less fair and egalitarian, it should intuitively follow (since current literature has 
shown egalitarian public institutions have been shown to foster trust) that they would 
express a lower level of behavioural trust in strangers compared to Hong Kong 
Chinese who reported perceiving their public institutions as more egalitarian. This 
was not the case as Ghanaians expressed more behavioural trust in strangers. These 
results imply an inconsistent relationship between behavioural trust in strangers and 
perceived nepotism in public institutions. Perceived nepotism in public institutions, 
in the present study, is unable to coherently explain cultural differences in 
behavioural trust in strangers.  
 
Finally, no coherent and significant relationships were found between perceived 
nepotism in public institutions and behavioural trust in strangers. These reasons ruled 
out the possibility of perceived nepotism in public institutions coherently explaining 
observed cultural differences in behavioural trust in strangers. The hypothesis that 
proposed public institutions to mediate the relationship between culture and 
behavioural trust in strangers was therefore not supported. 
 
6.2. Trust in strangers and social capital: The role of public institutions 
Findings from the present study support results from previous research that 
point to the importance of public institutions when it comes to trust-building. 
Self-report measures of trust in strangers supported the prediction that Hong Kong 
Chinese will report a higher trust tendency in strangers than Ghanaians. Furthermore 
perceived nepotism in public institutions successfully explained this observed 
cultural difference in trust in strangers as proposed. Hong Kong Chinese reported 
regarding their public institutions as more fair and egalitarian compared to 
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Ghanaians who reported a higher perception of nepotism. This resulted on Hong 
Kong Chinese reporting a higher trust in strangers. Another noteworthy finding was 
that, exploring the conceptualization of trust in strangers in the present study 
revealed that Ghanaians associate trust in strangers with familiar others while Hong 
Kong Chinese associate trust in strangers with unfamiliar others. It would intuitively 
follow that Ghanaians would report a higher level of trust in strangers. However, 
Hong Kong Chinese still reported a higher level of trust in strangers. The pattern of 
these results suggests that public institutions encourage trust in strangers when they 
are perceived to be fair and egalitarian in their dealings. Importantly, the influence of 
public institutions on trust in strangers in the present study was still potent in spite of 
how trust in strangers is conceived. 
 
The present study, unlike previous work that explored how public institutions 
impact a general form of trust examined how public institutions impact specific form 
of trust - trust in strangers. Consistent with research that has explored the relationship 
between public institutions and general trust, this work shows that public institutions 
do influence trust directed at strangers. As discussed earlier, trust is advantageous to 
societal functioning as it eases beneficial actions such as resource pooling and 
business venturing. Bellemare and Kroger (2003) argue the importance of trust in the 
transactions cost paradigm. They maintain that high levels of societal trust and 
trustworthiness reduce transaction costs. This increases efficiency of governments 
and organisations and consequently improves economic performance. Data from the 
World-Value Survey (WVS) suggests an increase in trust is associated with a higher 
increase in economic growth (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001). The 
same trust item on the WVS has been associated with judicial competence and 
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reduced corruption (La Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). The reasoning 
behind trust reducing transaction cost is that it eliminates the need for excessive and 
costly monitoring systems. Nevertheless it must be noted that before an environment 
where costly monitoring systems are reduced can be cultivated, institutions with 
oversight of ensuring reduced risk must prove they are up to the task in cases of 
violations. Results from this study suggest that egalitarian public institutions are key 
to encouraging trust in strangers. Therefore, in order to reap the benefits associated 
with trust in strangers, public institutions have to promote norms of trustworthiness 
and intolerance to exploitation. 
 
Stolle (2002) has theoretically examined the importance of public institutions in 
improving trust toward strangers. In her analysis she explores the debates that center 
on public institutions and how they influence generalized trust. Citing Uslaner (2002), 
Stolle avers that the level of inequality in the society is vital to generalized trust. This 
is because citizens will find it easier to extend trust beyond familiar others to 
strangers if they do not perceive public institutions to indulge in favouritsm.  
Scandinavian countries, whose public institutions are known to ensure high levels of 
income and gender equality, record the highest levels of trust. Rothstein and Stolle 
(2002) also note that experiences of rampant corruption and discrimination by 
political officials hamper not only institutional trust but trust in other citizens as well. 
They implicate socialization as a means by which this cycle is perpetuated.  Still 
within the arena of general trust and public institutions, Freitag and Buhlmann 
(2009), exploring contextual factors that promote trust, have found citizens are more 
likely to place trust in one another when institutions with authority are universalistic, 
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egalitarian, incorruptible, and punish non cooperative behaviour. They confirmed 
this hypothesis using data from WVS (1995-1997 and 1999-2001). 
 
Studies on the antecedents of generalized trust have provided important insights 
on how general trust can be sustained in a bid to increase social capital such as 
resource pooling. However, to better harness trust as a driver of social capital, there 
is the need to move to a more target specific from of trust, which is trust in strangers. 
Freitag and Buhlman (2009) note that incorruptible public institutions incentivize 
individuals toward cooperation by creating an egalitarian environment that fosters 
trust and quasi-acquaintances out of strangers. That being said, it would behoove 
trust research that attempts to contribute to social capital research to focus on trust in 
strangers instead of generalized trust.  
 
6.2.1. Signaling theory: Public institutions and sustaining a trusting 
environment  
Signaling theory may help in elucidating how cultural artefacts (e.g. perceived 
nepotism in public institutions) may explain differences in trust tendencies toward 
strangers. According to Dunham (2011) signaling theory explores the 
communication of information from one entity (the sender), to another entity (the 
receiver). Connelly, Certo Ireland and Reutzel (2011) in describing the fundamental 
processes underlying signaling theory posit that the sender must decide the process 
through which to signal (communicate) said information. The receiver on the other 
hand must choose how to interpret the received signal.  
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Applying signal theory to the present work, I theorize that the cultural 
environment within which an individual functions communicates signals that inform 
individuals about the most adaptive way to navigate such an environment. It should 
be noted however that the interpretation individuals’ give to received signals is as 
important as the signal sent. This can be related to levels of perceived nepotism in 
public institutions. Public institutions that are fair and dispassionate in dispensing 
their duties send signals of a fair environment. These signals aid individuals’ 
perceive an environment with structures that ensure intolerance to exploitation. This 
may have implications for trust tendencies since trust revolves around risk. 
Especially when dealing with strangers. If actors believe to be functioning in a less 
risky environment as a result of structures and monitoring systems put in place by 
egalitarian public institutions then a more positive outlook will be projected on 
trusting strangers as suggested by results in the present study. This is advantageous 
because as argued trust vested in strangers carry added risks but provide the most 
gains. If public institutions on the other hand send signals that indicate they condone 
nepotism such signals will point to a lax environment without safeguards against 
exploitation. Rothstein and Stolle (2003) make the following remark: if the officials 
of the government or public administrations are not fair and trustworthy why should 
the rest of society be? High rates of perceived nepotism in public institutions will 
therefore have detrimental effects on trust tendencies and as the present work 
suggests – trust tendencies toward strangers. 
 
Connelly et al. (2011) discussing signaling theory in organizational psychology 
posit that the phenomenon focuses on the deliberate communication of positive 
information by an organization in order to portray a positive image to an outsider. In 
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a culture on the contrary individuals aren’t just passive receivers of signals. We 
engage in shaping signals as we function in the culture and re-send out these signals. 
Grund and Sliwka (2007) posits that if a signal is interpreted in a certain way, an 
individual who is unsure about how to interpret such a signal may imitate others in 
their interpretation and decision-making. This may create a cycle that powers signals 
containing information about culture. 
 
6.3. Methodological Implications: The relationship between behavioural and 
self-report trust. 
 Behavioural trust in strangers revealed counterintuitive results that did not 
support initially proposed hypothesis. Contrary to prediction Ghanaians expressed 
more behavioural trust compared to Hong Kong Chinese. Behavioural trust in 
strangers was however consistent with manipulated conditions. Reciprocity or 
trustworthiness as manipulated by generosity of the opponent showed that dealing 
with a generous (more trustworthy) opponent elicited more trust behaviour than 
dealing with a thrifty (less trustworthy) opponent. This finding supported the initially 
proposed hypothesis. Perceived nepotism in public institutions was unable to explain 
observed cultural differences in behavioural trust in strangers. This was due to the 
pattern of findings regarding behavioural trust in strangers and perceived nepotism in 
public institutions. As Ghanaians reported a higher level of perceived nepotism 
compared to Hong Kong Chinese, it was expected that Ghanaians would show a 
lower level of behavioural trust. This is because perceived nepotism has shown to 
discourage trust not increase it. Furthermore significant and coherent relationships 
were not found between the behavioural measure of trust in strangers and perceived 
nepotism in public institutions. In fact behavioural measures of trust were not related 
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to all self-report measure including self-report trust in strangers. This finding rejected 
the proposed hypothesis that tendency will guide action resulting in a consequent 
positive relationship between self-report and behavioural trust in strangers. 
Nonetheless, perceived nepotism was able to explain observed cultural differences in 
self-report trust in strangers. 
 
These findings seem to suggest that in the present study, behavioural and 
self-report trust have been influenced differently. Behavioural trust in strangers 
varied as a result of manipulated generosity of the opponent. The generous opponent 
(in both samples) elicited more behavioural trust compared to that elicited by the 
thrifty opponent. Self-report trust in strangers on the other hand varied (across 
culture) as a result of perceived nepotism in public institutions as low perception of 
nepotism resulted in higher self-report trust in strangers. 
 
This pattern of results where behavioural and self-report measures of trust 
poorly correlate is consistent with current literature.  Similar to the research design 
of the present study, Glaeser et al. (2000) had participants complete a survey and 
participate in a trust game. Their findings did not yield a strong relationship between 
trust measures on the survey and behaviour exhibited in the trust game. The general 
trust question used – do you think most people can be trusted – was not significantly 
related to the amount of money sent during the trust game (-0.01, p > .05). Lazzarini, 
Madalozzo, Artes and de Oliveira Siqueira (2005) sought to replicate Glaeser et al.’s 
study in Brazil. Lazzarini et al. added a novel condition to that employed by Glaeser 
et al. Their study consequently had two conditions where participants met face to 
face with opponents or not. They also found that regardless of condition, self-report 
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measures of trust did not significantly predict trust behaviour in their experiment. In 
another study, Holm and Danielson (2005) found that survey items did not predict 
behaviour in the trust game experiment in Tanzania. In Sweden on the other hand 
they found survey items predicted trust behaviour. Ahmed and Salas (2009) also 
attempted to examine the self-report and behaviour relationship of trust in a 
cross-cultural study (Chile, Colombia, India, Mexico and Sweden). Their general 
trust item was able to predict trust behaviour in Colombia alone. Results from 
behavioural trust in strangers suggested that behavioural trust (across conditions) in 
strangers was influenced by reciprocity or trustworthiness as manipulated by 
generosity of the opponent.  
 
Results presented in the present study draws attention to the need to cautiously 
interpret results from trust research. Narrowing in on the main focus of the present 
study – trust in strangers – it appears self-report and behavioural measures of trust 
are influenced differently. Self-report trust appeared to have been influenced by a 
distal contextual factor, namely, perception of nepotism in public institutions. 
Behavioural trust seemed to have been influenced by a proximate factor, namely, 
generosity of the trustee. This pattern is consistent with current literature. Explaining 
results that pointed to the un-relatedness of self-report and behavioural measures, 
Ahmed and Salas (2009) draw on current theory of trust, which postulates micro and 
macro level trust. They suggest that self-report trust is influenced at the macro level 
while behavioural trust is influenced at the micro level. Buegelsdijk (2006) citing 
Luhman (1979) maintains that micro-level trust arises from emotional bonds 
individuals form while macro-level trust is based on institutional environment of 
laws and norms. Ahmed and Salas (2009) argue that self-report measures may 
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measure trust on the macro-level, whereas behavioural measurements may examine 
trust at the micro-level. Self-report and behaviour measures of trust in strangers 
examined in the present study exhibits a pattern consistent with Ahmed and Salas’s 
explanation.  
 
Findings in the current work have shown that perception of nepotism in public 
institutions may be serving as a macro-level contextual influence on the self-report 
measure of trust in strangers. Generosity also played the role of a micro-level 
influence on behavioural trust in both samples. It should be noted however that 
emotional bonds could not have played a role in the behavioural measure of trust in 
strangers in the present study. Participants did not have face-to-face interactions with 
their opponents. Besides, interaction was limited to transfers only; therefore forming 
emotional attachments (with their opponent) would have been unlikely. Experimental 
decisions in the trust game used here could reasonably have been made at the 
cognitive level not affect. Still trustworthiness, as maipulated by the generosity of the 
simulated player, presents a sensible case as a micro-level influence. 
 
Previous theorizing (Buegelsdijk, 2006; Ahmed & Salas, 2009) and findings 
(Glaeser et al. 2001; Lazzarini et al. 2005; Ahmed & Salas, 2009) as well as results 
presented in the current work call for the need to style trust research design more 
efficiently. Even though evidence suggesting self-report and behaviour measures 
target trust differently is still at its infancy, it would behoove trust research to exploit 
this finding to benefit more fine-tuned analyses. In this regard trust research aimed at 
investigating macro-level phenomena such as social capital or that aimed at 
informing policy should focus on self-report measures of trust. Behavioural measures 
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of trust may be directed at areas such as organizational psychology where 
micro-level influences are more practical and essential. 
 
6.4. Limitations and future directions 
The prime aim of the present research was to investigate the nature and 
explanations for differences between Ghanaians and Hong Kong Chinese on trust 
vested in strangers. Self-report measures revealed that perception of nepotism in 
public institutions plays an important role in determining trust toward strangers 
regardless of how trust in strangers is conceptualized. Behaviour measures on the 
other had presented counterintuitive results. First, Ghanaians exhibited more 
behavioural trust than their Hong Kong Chinese counterparts. This was 
counterintuitive because Ghanaians reported higher levels of perceived nepotism 
which should result in Ghanaians exhibiting lower beahvioural trust. Secondly, 
behavioural measures did not correlate with self-report measures of trust in strangers 
and perceived nepotism in public institutions. The present data is therefore unable to 
explain observed cultural differences in behavioural trust in strangers.  
 
Two possible explanations for this finding is that a cultural level schema may 
have been in play here, explaining why Ghanaians ended up transferring more points 
during the trust game. Going back to self-report measures, it was found that 
Ghanaians perceived their public institutions to be more nepotistic compared to 
Hong Kong Chinese. It could be that functioning in a nepotistic context primed 
Ghanaians toward ingratiating themselves to the other participant or using trust as a 
strategy to secure favourable outcomes in case of future interaction. This behavioural 
style among Ghanaians is seen more evidently in the thrifty opponent condition 
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where Ghanaian participants express relatively stable levels of trust compared to 
Hong Kong participants.  This could be mainly because they were unaware of the 
number of available transfer opportunities. Hong Kong Chinese participants on the 
other hand may not have felt the need to ingratiate as a personal strategy, as the 
context in which they are functioning does not reward nepotism. Secondly, the nature 
of trust in strangers as reported in the exploratory factor analysis showed that 
Ghanaians associate trust in strangers with familiar others. Hong Kong Chinese on 
the other hand associate trust in strangers with unfamiliar others. This could also 
have induced Ghanaians to express more behavioural trust in strangers in the trust 
game. The data obtained is unfortunately unable to ascertain this speculation. 
 
Future research may explore the function of trustworthiness (whether 
manipulated or not) more comprehensively in both survey and experimental design.  
Current literature has focused extensively on trust but findings are consistently 
showing the importance of exploring trustworthiness and the dynamics that underlie 
the phenomenon in trust venturing. Manipulating trustworthiness via alternative 
strategies (besides reciprocity and generosity) such as reputation and consistency of 
promise credibility will further unpack the dynamics of trust. 
 
Research, as in the present study, is increasingly finding inconsistent results in 
trust research when it comes to self-report and behaviour measures of trust. This calls 
for the need to conduct multilevel analyses, using representative samples, with 
systematically integrated behavioural and self-report measures not forgetting the use 
of targeted trust items. Moreover, experimental designs of the trust game must 
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endeavor to make contextual artefacts (e.g. nepotism in public institutions) other than 
characteristics of the opponent more salient.  
 
Experimental designs that ensure the saliency of other pertinent context effects 
in the trust game may reveal possible relationships between behavioural and 
self-report trust. Bellemare and Kroger (2003) remark that the predictive power of 
survey measures of trust are inextricably linked to the design of the trust game as 
well as the information experimenters pose on their participants. Since this study 
suggests that self-reporting retains cultural context influence, an attempt to prime 
such influences in the trust game will be beneficial to uncovering obscured 
relationships between self-reporting and behavioural measurement. The simplest and 
most objective way to introduce the salience of cultural context in the trust game will 
be to manipulate it via information posed on participants at the start of the game. For 
example, to make perceived nepotism in public institutions salient in the present 
study participants could have been asked to spend some time reflecting on their 
experiences with public institutions in their country before going on to play the game. 
This addition may help throw more light on the relationship between self-report and 
behaviour measures of trust.  
 
Also, using multilevel analysis will further unpack how contexts influence 
behaviour and self-report trust. The present work’s student sample profile while 
providing important insights cannot be generalized too widely. Representative 
samples will further aid extensive generalization and also examine relationships that 
may exist between self-report and behavioural trust. Additionally, using targeted 
trust items will eliminate ambiguities and confounds that obscure the psychological 
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correlates in trust measurement. The clear picture provided by such studies will aid 
accurate generalization of trust research. 
 
6.5. Conclusions 
The present study has made some contributions and practical applications worth 
noting. The unique contribution made by the present study is its focus on trust in 
strangers as opposed to a generalized form of trust. As previously discussed 
generalized trust assesses trust directed at both familiar and unfamiliar others. This 
obscures extending findings from generalized assessments of trust to inform the 
advantages to be reaped from trusting strangers. Targeted assessments of trust – trust 
in strangers as examined in the current research streamlines the extension of findings 
to inform the benefits to be gained from trusting strangers.  
 
Furthermore the present work has highlighted the important role of public 
institutions in creating an environment that encourages trust toward strangers. A 
significant partial mediation with perceived nepotism in public institutions as a 
mediator, explained observed cultural differences in trust in strangers. This showed 
that if public institutions are perceived to be fair and egalitarian thereby promoting a 
context of non-exploitation and trustworthiness, trust in strangers is encouraged. It 
should however be noted that since the present work showed a partial mediation 
other potential mediators such as ones trust disposition could provide insights on 
how trust in strangers is engendered. Stolle (2002) has noted that no single source of 
trust is all-encompassing in its explanatory power.  
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This study has also highlighted the need to be cautions when interpreting results 
from behavioural and self-report trust. The main reason for this is that the two 
assessments seem to be influenced differently. Self-report trust influenced more by 
the socio-cultural context while behavioural trust is influenced more by the 
proximate impact of the characteristics (trustworthiness) of the individual or entity 
being interacted with. The design of the trust game could be implicated in this 
disparity as it restricts the context of the game making trustworthiness the sole 
influence on behavioural trust in the game. To surmise, this work has contributed to 
the ever-evolving trust literature by investigating the antecedents and conceptions of 
trust in strangers. 
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Appendix 1: Pairwise comparisons of the main effect of transfers. 
 
(I) Transfers (J) Transfers Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
P value 
1 2 -.56 .002 
 3 -1.82 .000 
2 1 .56 .002 
 3 -1.27 .000 
3 1 1.82 .000 
 2 1.27 .000 
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Appendix 2: Comparison of Ghana and Hong Kong on confidence in public 
institutions. World Value Survey. Wave 5 (2005-2008). 
 
 Ghana Hong Kong   
 M SD M SD df t 
Police 2.42 .99 2.06 .56 2756 11.13* 
Parliament 2.21 .87 2.50 .62 2689 -9.76* 
The civil service 2.25 .84 2.39 .59 2668 -5.06* 
The government 2.05 .88 2.42 .65 2735 -12.06* 
*p < .0001 
 
 Most people can be 
trusted 
Can’t be too 
careful 
Total 
Ghana 130 1397 1527 
Hong Kong 505 725 1230 
 
X2 (1) = 407.00, p < .0001.  
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Appendix 3: World Governance Indicators: reports aggregate and individual 
governance indicators for 215 economies over the period 1996–2013 
 
 Hong Kong Ghana 
 Estimate Rank Data 
sources 
Estimate Rank Data 
sources 
Rule of law 1.54 91 10 0.11 56 17 
Control of corruption 1.63 92 10 -0.07 56.46 15 
Government 
effectiveness 
1.73 95.69 7 -0.09 50.72 12 
 
Estimate: Ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).  
 
Rank: Percentile rank among all countries (ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) 
rank). 
 
Data sources: Number of data sources on which estimate is based. 
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Appendix 4: Bilingual Questionnaire 
 
Informed consent statement 
 
I am a research postgraduate student at the Department of Applied 
Psychology, Lingnan University and currently conducting research on 
students’ investment behaviour. Your participation in this study is deeply 
appreciated.   This study consists of two sessions and will take 
approximately 20minutes to complete. The first session is a "points 
exchange game", which involves trading points with another participant. 
Participants who score high number of points would enter a lucky draw 
to win a prize. If you wish to enter this draw, kindly input your email 
address at the start of the game. Your email will ONLY be used as a 
means of contact, in the event that you win the prize.  Your information 
will NEVER be disclosed to any third party. The second session is a 
survey.   The information you provide in this study will only be used 
for research purposes. All personal data will be treated with strict 
confidentiality. Your participation is entirely voluntary. During the 
research you are free to withdraw at any point before your data have 
been collected.  Such decision has no implication to your school 
grades.   Thank you for participating in this study; your participation is 
vital to this research. Should you have any questions regarding this study, 
you may contact David Neequaye (Tel: (852) 69273929 / email: 
davidamonneequaye@ln.hk) 
 
        本人是嶺南大學應用心理學系的研究生，現正就學生投資行
為進行研究。非常感謝您的參與。     研究分為兩部分，需時約二
十分鐘。第一部分是交換點數遊戲，您將與另一位參與者交換點數。
取得高點數的參與者將被安排參與抽獎。若您希望參加抽獎，請於
遊戲開始時鍵入你的電郵地址。您的電郵衹會於您得獎時作聯絡用
途， 我們絕不會向任何人仕透露您的電郵。研究的第二部分是問卷
調查。     您於此研究提供的資料將衹被用於學術研究用途。所有
個人資料將嚴格保密。您的參與全屬自願；無論您參與與否，或於
研究任何階段中止參與，此決定均不會在任何方面影響您的學業成
績。     感謝您參與本研究，您的參與對此項研究非常重要。若您
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對本研究有任何問題，請聯絡 David   Neequaye (電話 : (852) 
69273929 / 電郵: davidamonneequaye@ln.hk)      
 I am clear about the purposes of this research and agree to participate 
in this study. (1) 
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Bilingual questionnaire 
Kindly input your questionnaire number. 
 
On a scale from 0-10, to what extent do you think the other participant in 
the Investment Game was a real opponent? 以 1－10分作評分，您有
多認為在投資遊戲中的是真實的對手？   
 0 (0) 
 1 (1) 
 2 (2) 
 3 (3) 
 4 (4) 
 5 (5) 
 6 (6) 
 7 (7) 
 8 (8) 
 9 (9) 
 10 (10) 
 
On a scale from 0-10, to what extent do you think the other participant 
was generous? 以 1－10分作評分，您認為另一位參與者的慷慨程度
是？   
 0 (0) 
 1 (1) 
 2 (2) 
 3 (3) 
 4 (4) 
 5 (5) 
 6 (6) 
 7 (7) 
 8 (8) 
 9 (9) 
 10 (10) 
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To what extent do you think that the treatment people get from the 
Police force in [R’s Country] depends on who they know? 香港警方給
予人的待遇會有多大程度是取決於他們的人事關係 ? 
 Definitely does 肯定會 (1) 
 Probably does 可能會 (2) 
 Neutral 中立 (3) 
 Probably does not 可能不會 (4) 
 Definitely does not 肯定不會 (5) 
 
 
To what extent do you think that the treatment people get from the 
Courts in [R’s Country] depends on who they know? 香港法院給予人
的待遇會有多大程度是取決於他們的人事關係 
 Definitely does 肯定會 (1) 
 Probably does 可能會 (2) 
 Neutral 中立 (3) 
 Probably does not 可能不會 (4) 
 Definitely does not 肯定不會 (5) 
 
To what extent do you think that the treatment people get from the 
government in [R’s Country] depends on who they know? 香港政府給
予人的待遇會有多大程度是取決於他們的人事關係 ? 
 Definitely does 肯定會 (1) 
 Probably does 可能會 (2) 
 Neutral 中立 (3) 
 Probably does not 可能不會 (4) 
 Definitely does not 肯定不會 (5) 
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To what extent do you think that the treatment people get from the 
legislative council in [R’s Country] depends on who they know? 香港
立法會給予人的待遇會有多大程度是取決於他們的人事關係 ? 
 Definitely does 肯定會 (1) 
 Probably does 可能會 (2) 
 Neutral 中立 (3) 
 Probably does not 可能不會 (4) 
 Definitely does not 肯定不會 (5) 
 
 
To what extent do you think that the treatment people get from the Civil 
service in [R’s Country] depends on who they know? 香港公務員給予
人的待遇會有多大程度是取決於他們的人事關係 ? 
 Definitely does 絕對是 (1) 
 Probably does 很可能是 (2) 
 Neutral 中立 (3) 
 Probably does not 很可能不是 (4) 
 Definitely does not 絕對不是 (5) 
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Indicate the degree to which you trust people from the following groups 
請標明您對以下群體成員的信任程度。   
 Do not 
trust at 
all 完全
不信任 
(1) 
Do not 
trust 
very 
much 不
甚信任 
(2) 
Neutral 
中立 (3) 
Trust 
somewhat 
有些信任 
(4) 
Trust 
completely 
完全信任 
(5) 
1. Your 
family 您
的家庭 
(1) 
          
2. People 
you know 
personally 
您認識的
人 (2) 
          
3. People 
you meet 
for the first 
time 第一
次見面的
人 (3) 
          
4. People 
of another 
religion 其
他宗教的
人 (4) 
          
People of 
another 
nationality 
其他國藉
的人 (5) 
          
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Appendix 5: Instructions to trust game 
 
Welcome to the POINTS EXCHANGE GAME! 
In the next section, you will be automatically paired with another participant 
who is currently taking part in this study, at the same time as you.  
在下一個部份，你將會跟另一位與您同時參與這項研究的參加者進行自動配
對。 
 
1. You will be engaging in a POINTS EXCHANGING GAME with the other 
participant, this exercise is designed to examine investment behaviour in 
students.  
你將會與另一位參加者進行一個點數交換遊戲，這次活動的目的是在於了解學
生的投資取向。  
 
2. After the whole study is over, participants with high number of points may 
win a prize. Such participants will be contacted via email. 
當整個研究結束後，獲得高點數的參加者們會自動參與抽獎。得獎者將會收到
有關電郵通知領獎。 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You both have 10(ten) points to start with and will be engaging in SEVERAL 
EXCHANGES. 
兩位參加者均獲分配 10個積分點去開始玩這個遊戲。在整個過程當中，你將
會有幾次機會跟對方交換點數。  
The sequence of your exchange will be determined by the computer system...  
電腦系統將決定你們交換點數的先後次序...  
[after 10 seconds] 
YOU have been selected to be the FIRST to make the point transfer in this session.  
你被選中在此環節中首先作點數轉讓。  
 
Note:  
 
At every stage, you will first transfer any number between 0(zero)and 10(ten) of 
points to the other participant. The number of points you transfer to the other 
participant will be doubled for him or her. For example, if you transfer 5 points to 
the other participant, it means that he or she will get 10 points in that transfer. 
在每一次的交換過程當中，你將會先轉讓從 0（零）到 10（十）之中的任何數
量的點數給另一位參加者。對方在該次交換中真正得到的點數將會是你所轉讓
的點數的兩倍。假設你轉讓 5點給對方, 他/ 她將會得到 10點。  
 
Then, the other participant will transfer any number between 0(zero) and 10(ten)of 
points back to you. The total number of points the other participant transfers to you 
will be doubled for you. For example, if he or she transfers 5 points to you, it means 
that you will get 10 points in that transfer. 
然後, 另一位參加者也將會轉讓從 0（零）到 10（十）之中的任何數量的點數
給你。你在該次交換中真正得到的點數將會是他/她所轉讓給你的數目的兩倍。
假設對方轉讓 5點給你, 你將會得到 10點。  
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Please be reminded that the more points you get, the more likely it would be for you 
to enter the lucky draw.  
請記著, 你所得的積分愈多, 你能夠參與抽獎的機會將會愈大。  
 
 
Screenshot of an excerpt of the trust game 
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